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INTRODUCTION

At the top of the corporate pyramid sits the chief executive officer
(“CEO”). Along with the board of directors, the CEO is primarily
responsible for the success of the company. When companies fail due to a
breakdown in governance or financial misconduct, shareholders lose.
Other stakeholders lose as well, including competitors, employees, and
ultimately the public at large.
It turns out that naked greed is not so good or right. The economic
and social costs of unmitigated greed include the failure of some of the
largest financial and insurance institutions in the world, government
bailouts on a scale previously unimaginable, crisis in the credit markets,
numerous corporate bankruptcies, and a badly demoralized stock market.1
Over-leveraged and unregulated risk taking, fueled by greed, has become
business as usual for some of the most revered companies in the United
States. 2 The fall of these publicly traded companies has crippled the U.S.
economy and spawned a worldwide recession. 3
The “culture of corporate greed” decried almost a decade ago by then
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan following the collapse of
Then, as now, management
Enron has continued unchecked.4
1. For a detailed discussion and description of events precipitating the present
financial crisis, see Inside the Meltdown (PBS television broadcast Feb. 17, 2009), available
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meltdown/view/ (last visited July 7, 2010).
2. See RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE
FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 156 (2007) (observing that it is more
likely that an unanticipated crisis will arise when market participants have a self-interest in
gaming the system); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 206 (2008)
(explaining that market participants have insufficient incentive to internalize their
externalities because the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual
market participants whereas the costs of exploitation, which affect the real economy, are
distributed among an even wider class of persons); see also Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta
Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long Term,
26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009) (linking pay packages to excessive risk-taking in the
financial system). Coverage of the financial disaster was spread across the front pages of
every major U.S. newspaper as well as documented in live broadcasts. The media described
the disaster that not only included the failure of companies like Merrill Lynch, Lehman
Brothers, and Bear Stearns, but also of Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac, arguably the two
largest companies on earth, which collectively held $5 trillion in mortgages. Inside the
Meltdown, supra note 1.
3. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008) (examining the causes of the subprime
crisis and its devolution into a larger global financial crisis); Fabrizio Ferri & James Weber,
AFSCME vs. Mozilo...and "Say on Pay" for All! (B), Harvard Business School Case No. 9109-157, at 1 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, Mar. 18, 2009) (summarizing
the sequence of events).
4. Richard S. Stevens, Culture of Corporate Greed, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at C8;
see also Louis Lavelle, The Best & Worst Boards: How the Corporate Scandals are
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irresponsibility produced a ripple effect on multiple stakeholders.5 At that
time, innumerable news headlines revealed corporate fraud, accounting
scandals, restatements of corporate earnings, and a shaken market. 6 Yet the
greed precipitating the demise of Arthur Andersen, Tyco, Merrill Lynch,
Adelphia, and other failures in governance and ethics were but a shadow of
things to come. 7
History repeated itself despite corporate corrections and claims of
moral and social obligations. Promises of ethical administration, however,
were often honored in their breach. 8 Management deviance was likewise
Sparking a Revolution in Governance, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 7, 2002 (describing Enron as
the “biggest governance failure in modern corporate history”). More recently, Harvard
professors Rakesh Khurana and Andy Zelleke advised that “contemporary business culture
has distorted the spirit of traditional American capitalism—ill at ease with unearned
wealth—by rewarding mediocrity and even failure.” You Can Cap The Pay, But The Greed
Will Go On, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2009, at B4.
5. See Patty M. DeGaetano, The Shareholder Direct Access Teeter-Totter: Will
Increased Shareholder Voice in the Director Nomination Process Protect Investors?, 41
CAL. W. L. REV. 361, 361 (2005) (“Enron and its progeny . . . cause[d] an unimaginable
ripple effect on the market, as tens of billions of dollars of market capital was destroyed,
workers’ retirement plans were devastated, shareholders’ dreams were ruined, and
individual investors’ trust in the stock market was shattered.”); Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11,
2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1585 (2002) (discussing the impact of the Enron collapse in the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and noting “[l]ike that of the Twin
Towers, Enron’s collapse was sudden, devastating, and horribly unjust in its effect”).
6. Enron’s fraud cost shareholders around $70 billion when the company’s stock price
collapsed. Bruce S. Schaeffer, Shelter from the Storm, THE DAILY DEAL (Aug. 11, 2003).
When WorldCom collapsed, it took the entire sector with it. Worldcom’s investors lost
$180 billion, competitors’ investors lost $7.8 billion, and overall social welfare costs were
estimated to be $49 billion. Gil Sadka, The Economic Consequences of Accounting Fraud
in Product Markets: Theory and a Case from the U.S. Telecommunications Industry
(WorldCom), 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 439, 463 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Year of Scandal, Year of Shame, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 23, 2002, at 6 (citing the
senior executives of companies involved in Enron and other financial debacles that were
charged with fraud and other crimes); Citizen Works, The Corporate Scandal Sheet,
http://www.citizenworks.org/corp/corp-scandal.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (listing
companies investigated for dishonesty and fraud from 2001-2005). See generally Lawrence
A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Might
Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) (reviewing big four frauds and reading SarbanesOxley reforms as modest at best); Cary Coglianese et al., The Role of Government in
Corporate Government, Regulatory Policy Program Report RPP-08 (Cambridge, MA:
Center for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, 2004) (summarizing conference dialogue concerning potential reforms to restore
corporate integrity and market confidence).
8. See WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 158-59 (2006) (listing an array of corporate ethical
representations from companies (or their senior executives) that were under criminal
investigation). Many corporations engage in “blue-washing” and “green-washing.” “Bluewashing” corporations claim the mantle of ethical leadership by affiliating with the United
Nations while doing little to actualize the ideals of the Global Compact; “green-washing” is
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not deterred by the plethora of reforms and high-profile investigations and
prosecutions. 9 Neither the changes in the law nor the emphasis on its
enforcement were enough to stem the ubiquity of greed. 10
Amidst daily revelations of corporate misdeeds, the ideas of business
ethics, good corporate citizenship, and organizational accountability are
being addressed with new resolve. 11 The “greed is good” mantra once
done by making dubious public relations claims about sustainability and eco-friendly
actions. See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing,
12 J. BUS. ETHICS 253 (2003) (discussing companies’ social reporting and corporate
compliance responsibilities). Reputation washing extends far beyond genuine public
relations practice to include insidious deception. LAUFER, supra, at 163 (“It is trickery that
not only uses publicity to explain the problem away but also portrays the ethical laggard—
the [. . .]washer—as an ethical leader.”); see also Donald O. Mayer, Kasky v. Nike and the
Quarrelsome Question of Corporate Free Speech, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 65-96 (2007)
(analyzing the first legal challenge of reputation washing as consumer fraud and its ethical
implications). Washing as it relates to social accounting is also common practice. See
David Owen & Tracey Swift, Introduction: Social Accounting: Reporting and Auditing:
Beyond the Rhetoric?, 10 BUS. ETHICS: EUROPEAN REV. 4 (2001) (noting the “specious
gloss” on social reporting initiatives in the United States and Europe). For a history of
corporate reputation management and the quest for social and moral legitimacy, see
ROLAND MARCHLAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
AND CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS (1998).
9. See, e.g., LAUFER, supra note 8, at 40-41 (listing hundreds of lawsuits against
numerous multi-national companies instituted by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Corporate Fraud Task Force, and Department of Justice in the aftermath of SarbanesOxley). Then President Bush established the Corporate Fraud Task Force with the goal of
“cleaning up corruption in the board room and restoring investor confidence.” CORPORATE
FRAUD TASK FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (2004). He declared that:
“Corporate responsibility is essential to America. It is essential to shareholders. It is
essential to investors.” Id. These efforts were undertaken to calm investor fears, revive
perceptions of legitimacy in markets, and demonstrate the resolve of state and federal
regulators. See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from
the Recent Financial Scandals about Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of
Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285 (2004) (providing an overview of reforms aimed at
enabling better oversight of various corporate stakeholders); see also Henry T.C. Hu,
Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1502 (1993) (observing that government
and not the private sector has the incentive to become informed about systemic risks).
10. LAUFER, supra note 8; see also Khurana & Zelleke, supra note 4, at B4 (“[P]ublic
companies have become largely personal ATMs, machines from which to extract as much
personal wealth as quickly as possible, within the boundaries of the law (usually).”); cf.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the ‘Subprime’ Mortgage Crisis, 60 S. C. L. REV. 549
(2009) (noting the need for regulation to address the collective-action problem of systemic
risk even in the absence of greed).
11. The basic concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is that business has
responsibilities beyond shareholders or investors in the firm. One of the early classics on
corporate social responsibility is HOWARD R. BOWEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
BUSINESSMAN (1953). Bowen believed that the several hundred largest businesses in the
United States were vital centers of power and decision making; thus, the decisions of these
businesses affected the lives of citizens in many ways. He believed that businesses had the
responsibility to conform to the values and aims of the society in which they were
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heard on Wall Street has been replaced with an urgent cry for conscience
and a restoration of confidence in corporate behavior. 12 In fact, the gravity
of the current crisis has pushed reform proposals to the front of the public
policy agenda in our nation’s capital. As Wall Street moves to K Street,
the effectiveness of existing laws, regulations, and regulatory bodies are
being re-examined in a search for long-term reform. 13
One target of the reform measures is excessive executive

embedded. At the time, 93% of businessmen surveyed agreed with him. CSR became a
frequent topic of conversation among businesspeople in the 1970s, which was one reason
that economist Milton Friedman came out with his often-quoted article for the New York
Times magazine, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits.” (Sept. 13,
1970). The essence of Friedman’s critique, still debated to this day, is that managers have
no special expertise in philanthropy or social good, and that managers who spend corporate
equity to be “socially responsible” are wrongfully using shareholder money without clear
benefit to the company. Despite this critique, the notion that corporations have
responsibilities beyond those to its investors continues to have many adherents. See, e.g.,
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (C.K. Prahalad & Michael E.
Porter eds., 2003); Archie Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a
Definitional Construct, 38 BUS. & SOC’Y 268 (1999); see also ED FREEMAN, STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984) (promoting “stakeholder theory” in
contrast to seeing the corporation as solely responsible to its shareholders).
More recently, management and business ethics scholars have advanced a related
notion of corporate citizenship. Simply put, corporate citizenship is “CSR plus.” The
“plus” speaks to a corporation’s public advocacy, including its lobbying efforts. To some
observers, this goes beyond giving moral consideration to stakeholders beyond investors,
and speaks to the power of corporations to influence public policy that sets the rules of the
game for business activities. For the growing discussion of corporate citizenship, see DAVID
VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY (2005); Dirk Matten et al., Behind the Mask: Revealing the True Face of
Corporate Citizenship, J. BUS. ETHICS 109 (2003); Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido
Palazzo, Toward a Political Conception of Corporate Responsibility: Business and Society
Seen from a Habermasian Perspective, 32 ACAD. MGT. REV. 1096 (2007). For an earlier
debate over the objective of business, compare A.A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers
in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931) with E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
12. See Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1319 (July
30, 2002), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2002-book2/pdf/PPP-2002book2-doc-pg1319.pdf (last visited July 7, 2010) (“[C]orporate corruption has struck at
investor confidence, offending the conscience of our Nation.”). See also Sarah H. Duggin &
Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: The Disney Standard and the
“New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 261 (2006) (“Corporate governance reform
became a national priority following the financial disasters that ravaged Enron, WorldCom
and other corporate giants beginning in the fall of 2001.”).
13. See Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, Op-Ed, The End of the Financial World as
We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK9 (criticizing the governmental focus on shortterm improvements in investor confidence); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating
Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 266-67 (2010) (proposing a
market-liquidity-provider concept as an improvement over the current ad hoc approaches
taken by the Bush and Obama administrations); infra notes 14, 37-38 (discussing
government reforms).
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compensation. 14 Indeed, with skyrocketing CEO paychecks 15 linked to
layoffs, plant closings, and corporate downsizing, 16 few issues in the
14. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, FDIC Pushes to Rein in Executive Pay at Banks,
WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/12/AR2010011201492.html? (last visited July 7, 2010)
(discussing proposal advanced by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to penalize
banks for risky compensation practices); Andrea Fuller, House Backs Limits on Pay To
Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2009, at B1 (reviewing passage of the bill introduced by
Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, to limit executive pay
by eliminating conflict of interests on compensation committees, requiring nonbinding
shareholder vote on pay, and authorizing rulemaking to regulate pay packages at companies
whose assets total more than $1 billion). The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 (EESA), for instance, has a number of restrictions on executive pay for the
participating firms. See Ferri & Weber, supra note 3, at Exhibit 2 (summarizing the
executive compensation provisions in the EESA); see also V.G. Narayanan et al., Executive
Pay and the Credit Crisis of 2008, Harvard Business School Case No. 109-036 (Boston:
Harvard Business School Publishing, 2008) (discussing the credit crisis, executive
compensation, and their interaction). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
subsequently passed in February 2009 after the transition to the Obama administration,
added new restrictions for highly-paid executives of financial institutions that receive TARP
assistance, including prohibitions against paying bonuses, retention awards, or incentive
compensation (other than payments of long-term restricted stock). H.R. REP. NO. 111-64, at
2-3 (2009). Notably, the statutory limitations on pay do not affect the past compensation of
executives at those failing financial institutions whose CEOs received billions for their
actions that helped bring down the investment-banking system and cause the credit crisis.
Id.; see also Tom Randall & Jamie McGee, Wall Street Executives Made $3 Billion Before
Crisis,
BLOOMBERG,
Sept.
26,
2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aGL5l6xOPEHc (last visited
Feb. 15, 2010) (“Wall Street's five biggest firms paid more than $3 billion in the last five
years to their top executives, while they presided over the packaging and sale of loans that
helped bring down the investment-banking system.”).
15. Between 1970 and 1996, median cash compensation paid to S&P 500 CEOs
(including salaries, bonuses, and small amounts of other cash pay) more than doubled.
Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation 1 (April 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors) [hereinafter Executive Compensation]. During the same timeframe, median
total realized compensation (including cash pay, restricted stock, payouts from long-term
pay programs, and the amounts realized from exercising stock options) nearly quadrupled.
Id. at 76. From 1992 through 2000, “median total compensation nearly tripled from $2.3
million in 1992 to over $6.5 million in 2000.” Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive
Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 847, 847 (2002) (referring specifically to chief executive officers in S&P 500
Industrials (companies excluding utilities and finance firms)). In 2006, the median total
compensation of the top 150 U.S. CEOs was $10.1 million. Edward Dash, More pieces.
Still a puzzle., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at sec.3; see also Jeffrey Moriarty, How Much
Compensation Can CEOs Permissibly Accept?, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 235 (2009) (noting
CEO pay is 314 times the $32,142 earned by the median full-time private industry worker in
the U.S. in 2006).
16. See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation and the Modern Industrial
Revolution, 15 INT’L J. INDUST. ORG. 417 (1997) (noting perception of high CEO salaries as
producing harmful consequences); Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive
Compensation, 63 U. CINN. L. REV. 713 (1995) (same); accord Michael C. Jensen, The
Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN.
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history of the modern corporation have attracted as much attention.17
Commentators have noted that it “has taken center stage in the governance
reform debate in the United States.”18
The suggested legislative correctives are reinforced by the ethics
literature where much critical ink has been spilt regarding ethical duties in
corporate governance.19 There is a developing consensus that directors
have a moral obligation not to pay excessive executive compensation
Some
relative to performance, the market, or other indicators. 20
831 (1993) (showing that downsizing increases stock prices in industries with excess
capacity which would tie layoffs to an increase in value of executive stock options); see also
James B. Wade et al., Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid Managers: Equity and Executive
Compensation, 17 ORGAN. SCIENCE 527 (2006) (surveying literature showing that perceived
pay inequities lead to lower productivity and product quality, decreased employee morale,
and increased turnover); cf. David Hirshleifer, Managerial Reputation and Corporate
Investment Decisions, 22 FIN. MGMT. 145, 146 (1993) (explaining that investor beliefs about
manager and firm reputation influence the cost of raising capital, recruiting employees, and
marketing products).
17. Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 1 (“Once relegated to the
relative obscurity of business periodicals, executive pay has become an international issue
debated in Congress and routinely featured in front-page headlines, cover stories, and
television news shows.”).
18. Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay Vote and CEO Compensation: Evidence
from the UK 2 (Mar. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). William H.
Donaldson, former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman, explained: “One of the
great, as-yet-unsolved problems in the country today is executive compensation and how it
is determined.”
Lori Calabro, Regulators and Shareholders Want Compensation
Committees to Explain Why CEOs Make So Much, CFO MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2003, available
at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3010475?f=related (last visited July 7, 2010). The new
constraints on executive pay proposed in the bill passed by the House on July 31, 2009 are
also evidence that Congress was serious about regulating compensation packages with large
bonuses that are often cited as a cause of the financial crisis. See Fuller, supra note 14
(discussing the proposed bill). The Senate was set to consider executive compensation as
part of a regulatory overhaul package after its August recess. Id.
19. See STEPHEN M. GOLDMAN, TEMPTATIONS IN THE OFFICE: ETHICAL CHOICES AND
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS (2008) (asserting that business men and women have moral duties not
encompassed by legal requirements); see also Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization,
Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235 (2002)
(arguing that clarification of the criteria on which executives are evaluated will maximize
value); John J. McCall, Assessing American Executive Compensation: A Cautionary Tale
for Europeans, 13 BUS. ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REV. 243 (2004) (assessing executive pay
from a moral perspective); Bruce Walters et al., Top Executive Compensation: Equity or
Excess? Implications for Regaining American Competitiveness, 14 J. BUS. ETHICS 227
(1995) (calling for reforms to ensure compensation is not controlled solely by management);
cf. Alexei M. Marcoux, A Fiduciary Argument Against Stakeholder Theory, 13 BUS. ETHICS
Q. 1 (2003) (demonstrating the moral inadequacy of stakeholder theory). See generally
John Hasnas, The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed, 8 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 19 (1998) (examining three normative theories of business ethics).
20. See Mel Perel, An Ethical Perspective on CEO Compensation, 48 J. BUS. ETHICS
381, 385-86 (2003) (examining the ethical considerations in CEO compensation); see also
Jeffrey Moriarty, Do CEOs Get Paid Too Much?, 15 BUS. ETHICS Q. 257 (2005) (arguing
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scholarship even suggests that the CEO has an ethical obligation not to
accept such excessive compensation. 21
The absence of ethical awareness among elite boards is amply
illustrated in the actions of American International Group (AIG). The
insurance giant engendered public disapproval when it paid millions of
dollars in bonuses to its top employees in the wake of a 180 billion dollar
government bail-out. 22 As for the credit default swap business gone awry
that caused the company’s downfall, former CEO Greenberg explained:
“They got greedy.” 23 Given the Obama administration’s acquiescence in
the face of AIG’s insistence that contract considerations have tied its hands
in attempting a return of taxpayer money, AIG also apparently got away
with it. 24
that CEOs get paid too much under any theory); discussion infra Part V.B.
21. Moriarty, supra note 20; discussion infra Part V.B.
22. In September 2008, the Federal Reserve authorized the first infusion of cash to
AIG. Congress later supplemented these funds with the $700 billion bailout bill (EESA),
which established the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). See Edmund L. Andrews et
al., Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at
A1 (calling the Federal Reserve’s loan the “most radical intervention in private business in
the central bank’s history”); Stephen Bernard, Bailed-Out AIG Seeks Gov’t Approval to
Give Million-dollar Bonuses to Executives, ASSOC. PRESS, July 10, 2009,
http://www.cnsnews.com/public/content/article.aspx?RsrcID=50854 (noting AIG’s total
loan package is $182.5 billion); see also After Rescue, Bonuses Still Flow At AIG, CBS
NEWS ONLINE, Dec. 11, 2008, http://cbs2.com/business/aig.federal.bailout.2.884982
[hereinafter After Rescue] (quoting the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury calling the
retention payments “excessive” for a failing institution). Prior to the bonus payments, the
company executives enjoyed a desert spa retreat within days of receiving the government’s
infusion of cash. Peter Whoriskey, AIG Spa Trip Fuels Fury on Hill, WASH. POST, Oct. 8,
2008,
at
D1,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/10/07/AR2008100702604.html?sid=ST2008100702063.
23. Ex-CEO Greenberg Calls for Revamped AIG Bailout, WORKFORCE MGMT., Apr. 7,
2009, available at http://www.workforce.com/section/00/article/26/29/87.php. AIG sued
Greenberg for illegally taking $4.3 billion in stock the year of his departure. Mary Williams
Walsh, Ex-chief and AIG Set for Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2009, at B1.
24. See Obama Tries to Stop AIG Bonuses: “How Do They Justify This Outrage?”,
CNN
NEWS,
Mar.
16,
2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/16/AIG.bonuses/index.html; Edmund L. Andrews
& Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
14,
2009,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/business/15AIG.html?emc=eta1 (reporting that when
word of bonuses reached the Obama administration, U.S. “Treasury Secretary Timothy F.
Geithner told the firm they were unacceptable and demanded they be renegotiated . . . . but
that the bonuses w[ould] go forward because lawyers said the firm was contractually
obligated to pay them.”). Congress did attempt to reclaim the funds via an excise tax. See
Greg Hitt, Drive to Tax AIG Bonus Slows, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2009, at A1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123794222776332903.html (reporting that a bill imposing a
90% excise tax on AIG bonuses paid to individual employees passed the House); see also
The AIG Key Executives Bonus Accountability and Capture Act, H.R. 1598, 111th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009). The House Judiciary Committee also attempted to remedy the audacity of
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The AIG situation is neither new nor unique. 25 In this country and
abroad, “fat cats” and “rewards for failure,” such as handsome retirement
packages and option repricings, have incited shareholder and community
outrage. 26 Outside the United States, calls for increased accountability to
shareholders have been heard and legislation adopted.27 Within the
country, the debate continues as federal and state policymakers jockey for
position along with the corporate clientele they serve. 28

AIG in the “End Greed” Bill (End Government Reimbursement of Excessive Executive
Disbursements). H.R. REP. NO. 111-50, at 3-4 (2009) (authorizing the Justice Department to
sue for the return of bonuses given to employees of companies that have received more than
$10 billion from the government on a fraudulent transfer theory and giving the Attorney
General power to limit executive compensation to ten times the average non-management
wages as a company would have to do in bankruptcy). For a discussion of the continuing
bonus saga, see infra Part VI.B.
25. See, e.g., Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During
Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2009, at A1 (reporting that “nine of the financial firms that
were among the largest recipients of federal bailout money paid about 5,000 of their traders
and bankers bonuses of more than $1 million apiece for 2008 . . . . President Obama called
financial institutions ‘shameful’ for giving themselves nearly $20 billion in bonuses as the
economy was faltering and the government was spending billions to bail [them] out”).
26. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1999) (noting that “[o]utraged
investors have made their views known to corporate boards of directors using shareholder
proposals, binding bylaw amendments, ‘Just Vote No’ campaigns, and other activist
efforts”); Rik Kirkland, The Real CEO Pay Problem, FORTUNE, July 10, 2006, at 78, 80
(“[T]he outrage has grown so intense that the country’s top CEOs are now vigorously
debating the problem in private.”); see also Ferri & Maber, supra note 18, at 1 (noting that
the rapid growth of CEO pay had often made headlines in the British Press (citing Charles
Arthur, The Fat Cats Are Back, INDEP., July 25, 2000)); BBC NEWS, Glaxo Backs Down on
CEO Pay Deal, Nov. 26, 2002; BBC NEWS, Vodafone Risks Fury over Boss’s Pay, June 19,
2002; Tony Jackson, The Fat Cats Keep Getting Fatter, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1998.
27. See generally STEPHEN DEANE, WHAT INTERNATIONAL MARKETS SAY ON PAY—AN
INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE (Institutional Shareholder Servs.) 2 (2007) (listing other countries
that have adopted or are considering similar legislation such as Norway, Sweden, Australia,
and the Netherlands); Stephen Davis, Does ‘Say on Pay’ Work? Lessons on Making CEO
Compensation Accountable (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors),
http://millstein.som.yale.edu/Davis_Say_on_Pay_Policy%20Briefing.pdf (discussing how
the U.S. could benefit from the U.K.’s experience with legislation on advisory voting on
executive compensation).
28. See, e.g., Posting of Ted Allen to RiskMetrics Group, Risk & Governance Blog, A
“New Opening” for Investors, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/gov/2008/11/a-new-opening-forinvestorssubmitted-by-ted-allen-publications.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (“With the
election of Barack Obama, investor activists are hopeful that his administration will open
the door to advisory votes on executive pay, proxy access, broker voting reform, and greater
attention to environmental and social issues.”); discussion infra Part II.A.
The debate extends beyond the Capitol to universities across the nation. Philosophy,
law, and business scholars have been researching the problem and proposing solutions. See
Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 1 (“There has also been an explosion in
academic research on executive compensation.”). For a summary of the evolving business
literature and research spanning accounting, economics, finance, industrial relations,
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As legislatures fight the good fight to curb executive pay packages
against the interests and designs of political lobbyists, this article suggests a
role for courts in the reform process. It proposes a judge-made solution to
support the regulatory reform effort to help keep corporate executive
compensation abuses in check. In particular, it maintains that courts should
consider applying the equitable doctrine requiring a litigant to have “clean
hands” 29 to bar civil lawsuits by CEOs seeking damages for breach of
contract against companies that refuse to pay remuneration schemes that
are excessive by market and/or other standards. Consideration of the
defense in this situation would encourage directors to withhold payment
while simultaneously stymieing executive overreaching and the substantial
corporate costs that go along with it. Significantly, the legal evaluation of
unclean hands in the case of excessive executive compensation is informed

organizational behavior, strategy, and executive compensation, see Allen, supra.
Scholarship from business academics in the last decade has also been extensive. Sherwin
Rosen, Contracts and the Market for Executives, in CONTRACT ECONOMICS 181 (Lars Werin
& Hans Wijkander, eds., 1992); Gerald T. Garvey & Todd T. Milbourn, Asymmetric
Benchmarking in Compensation: Executives are Rewarded for Good Luck but Not
Penalized for Bad, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 197 (2006); Henry L. Tosi et al., How Much Does
Performance Matter? A Meta-analysis of CEO Pay Studies, 26 J. MGMT. 301 (2000); Ravi
Singh, Board Independence and the Design of Executive Compensation (2006) (Harvard
Business School Working Paper, on file with authors). For legal literature addressing
excessive executive pay, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who
Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615 (2005); William W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament
Over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557 (2005); John E. Core et al., Is U.S.
CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005);
Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1 (2000); James McConvill, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance:
Rising Above the “Pay-for-Performance Principle,” 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 413 (2006). For
ethics scholarship addressing executive compensation, see supra notes 19-21.
29. See generally T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A Process-Based Theory of
Unclean Hands 47 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Process-based Theory of
Unclean Hands] (suggesting a four-phase theory of incorporation for the procedural
protection of the court); T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of
Unclean Hands, 99 KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Limiting Legal Remedies]
(analyzing and synthesizing cases accepting and rejecting unclean hands in legal cases); T.
Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-merger Justification of Unclean Hands,
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 455 (2008) [hereinafter Post-merger Justification of Unclean Hands]
(proposing merger theory that allows for the incorporation of unclean hands in damages
actions); see also T. Leigh Anenson, Litigation Between Competitors with Mirror
Restrictive Covenants: A Formula for Prosecution, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2005)
(discussing use of equitable defenses and other strategies to preclude competitor challenge
to validity of employment non-compete agreement); T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity
in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 51-52 (2005) (outlining potential
use of unclean hands and other equitable defenses in the context of employment noncompete agreements).
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by the ongoing conversation among legal, business, and ethics scholars and
attempts an interdisciplinary approach to the problem. 30
The equitable maxim of “he [or she] who comes into equity must
come with clean hands” was developed to “protect the court against the
odium that would follow its interference to enable a party to profit by his
[or her] own wrong-doing.” 31 Conduct need not be illegal to constitute
unclean hands and warrant dismissal. 32 Behavior that does not conform to
“minimum ethical standards” in business satisfies the doctrine. 33
While there have been countless cases of unclean hands involving
unethical or immoral conduct in commercial settings over the course of the
last three centuries, 34 no court has considered the defense in the context of
excessive compensation. But no court has refused its application either.
Indeed, no board has attempted to withhold or reduce executive
compensation schemes. This article contends that the doctrine could be put
to good use in cases where executives have engaged in unethical conduct
and still pursued contract claims without “clean hands.” It argues that
courts have discretion in determining whether conduct is unclean as it
relates to pay at the time of contract formation up until full execution.35
Parts II through VI justify uniting and extending the legal, business, and
30. See Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 1 (“CEO pay research has
grown even faster than CEO paychecks.”).
31. N. Pacific Lumber Co. v. Oliver, 596 P.2d 931, 939-40 (Or. 1979) (quoting Henry
Lacey McClintock, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 63 (1948)).
32. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
815 (1945) (holding that “misconduct need not necessarily have been of such a nature to be
punishable as a crime or to justify legal proceedings of any character”); Keystone Driller
Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-45 (1933) (commenting that unclean hands
may be invoked on the basis of “conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle”);
Deweese v. Reinhard, 165 U.S. 386, 390 (1897) (reasoning that “[a]ny and all misfeasance
that smacks of injustice may constitute ‘unclean hands’”).
33. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 816; see also Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-94 (1942) (holding that equity may rightly withhold its assistance
from improper business practices); 4 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK &
MONOPOLY § 23:14 (4th ed. 2001 Supp.) (stating that the doctrine of unclean hands “is of
special importance in unfair competition cases, for fairness in business . . . is a common
duty owed by all to all”).
34. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming Into Equity With Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV.
877, 878 (1949) [hereinafter Chafee I] (detailing cases involving unethical conduct in
commercial settings); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming Into Equity With Clean Hands, 47
MICH. L. REV. 1065 (1949) [hereinafter Chafee II] (examining the same such cases as those
outlined in Chaffee I); see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 2
(1950) (exploring the rules of carrying on utilized by equity courts). For legal research on
unclean hands since Chafee’s publications, see supra note 29.
35. See infra Part VI.B. (explaining the circumstances under which the defense may
apply). If the CEO has been paid an excessive amount (through, for example, a bonus or
severance package), the company may seek rescission on the basis of unclean hands similar
to other traditional contract defenses. See infra Part IV.B and note 225 (discussing how
several contract defenses derived from equity).
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ethics literature to defend the use of the unclean hands doctrine under
circumstances constituting excessive executive compensation.
Part II explains that the use of the unclean hands is consistent with the
political will embodied in existing federal law like Sarbanes-Oxley and
proposed reform measures that include shareholder “say on pay”
legislation. Part III maintains that the invocation of unclean hands in
response to executive overreaching in contract cases strengthens the
primary role of states as the custodians of corporate integrity and
governance. Allowing unclean hands in breach of contract cases brought
by errant executives sustains the long-established fiduciary duties of
directors in the corporate law of the several states. It also supports the new
duty of good faith recently recognized in Delaware. The unclean hands
defense prevents corporate liability for breach of contract and, at the same
time, possibly avoids personal liability for directors for the lack of good
faith in the exercise of their management responsibilities.
Part IV discusses how defeating excessive compensation by applying
the clean hands doctrine in damages actions preserves the traditional
purpose and use of the defense to curtail unethical business practices in
contract cases. Judicial invocation of unclean hands also continues the
modern doctrinal trend of extending the defense to damages actions. It
additionally reinforces the role of equity in maintaining the integrity of the
law.
Part V argues that freedom of contract interests are outweighed by
fairness concerns in the form of unclean hands in considering executive
overcompensation by reference to the medieval theory of “just price” and
modern ideas in business ethics. It describes the ethical principles
reinforcing the “clean hands” doctrine and outlines the evolution in ethics
which supports the notion that both directors and CEOs have moral
obligations to their companies concerning executive pay.
Part VI outlines a measure of “excessiveness” that courts can and
should apply. It takes as a starting point existing ethical standards as well
as compensation considerations in corporate legal settings and unites them
with the economic and other determinants derived from business
disciplines. It then illustrates how the defense would work by reference to
the many real life examples of executive excesses. The article concludes
that the application of unclean hands to check compensation abuses is a
legitimate and effective role for courts in the reform process.
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FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM

The use of unclean hands to curb executive compensation abuses is
consistent with the political will embodied in existing federal law and many
proposed reform measures. In particular, these reforms seek shareholder
“say on pay” as well as greater accountability in general.
A

Shareholder “Say on Pay” Reform

Shareholder accountability and participation on pay packages have
been part of the bailout discussions.36 The controversial $700 billion
government rescue plan enacted as the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 contains executive pay restrictions contingent on the kind of
government aid received by the corporation. 37
Bills have also been introduced in Congress mimicking legislation in
the United Kingdom and other countries. 38 Legislation was enacted by the
36. See, e.g., Jie Cai & Ralph J. Walkling, Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create
Value? (2007) (unpublished comment, Drexel University Working Paper, on file with
authors). Shareholder “say on pay” is mandatory for companies receiving federal aid under
TARP and Treasury officials have stated that an advisory vote on executive pay may soon
be required of all publicly traded companies. Say on Pay: Are You Ready?, NACD
DIRECTORS DAILY, July 27, 2009, at 2. Scholars have also recommended similar nonbinding shareholder votes on executive compensation issues as a matter of state statutory
reform. See Loewenstein, supra note 28, at 28; Thomas & Martin, supra note 26, at 104348; cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the
Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 702
(2005) (arguing for a Compensation Discussion and Analysis signed by the compensation
committee members and submitted to the shareholders for approval).
37. See supra note 14 (discussing reform measures for excessive executive
compensation). Enacted in response to our current financial crisis, the EESA effectively
allows the Treasury to buy mortgage-related “troubled” assets and invest in banks and
insurance companies to shore up their capital. See also A Year of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average,
THE
BOSTON
GLOBE,
Oct.
10,
2008,
available
at
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2008/10/10/dow_1year (demonstrating that by the
close of trading on Friday, October 10, 2008, the Dow Jones had lost 39.4% of its value
from a year earlier); The Dow Jones Industrials’ Moves since Lehman Fall, LAS VEGAS SUN,
Sept. 9, 2009, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/sep/09/the-dow-jonesindustrials-moves-since-lehman-fall/ (reporting that the week following the emergency
legislation, the Dow Jones industrial average dropped each day, for a total six-day loss of
2,031.65 points).
38. See Ferri & Maber, supra note 18 (noting binding shareholder say on pay legislation
in Norway, Sweden, Australia, and the Netherlands). In April 2007, the House of
Representatives approved a bill seeking to introduce a say on pay rule. H.R. 1257, 110th
Cong. (2007). An analogous bill was introduced in the Senate by then-presidential
candidate Barack Obama. S. 1181, 110th Cong. (2007); Stephen Taub, Obama Pushes Say
On Pay, Apr. 11, 2008, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/11037327/c_11036422;
Posting of L. Reed Walton to Risk & Governance Blog, U.S. Senate Takes up “Say on Pay”
Bill , http://blog.riskmetrics.com/gov/2007/04/us-senate-takes-up-say-on-pay-billsubmitted-
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UK government in 2002 in response to investors concerned with the
adoption of controversial U.S.-style compensation practices. 39 The law
mandates an annual, advisory shareholder vote on the executive
compensation report prepared by the board of directors and has been
successful in increasing the dialogue between shareholders and
management. 40
Additionally, some U.S. firms have voluntarily adopted “say on pay”
practices and others will likely follow.41 Given the negative view of
by-l-reed-walton-staff-writer.html (Apr. 30. 2007); cf. H.R. 4291, 109th Cong. (2005)
(requiring shareholder approval of compensation and golden parachute plans). For other
reforms, see Martin, infra note 67, at 532.
39. Have Fat Cats Had Their Day?, THE ECONOMIST, May 24, 2003, at 63. For a
comparison of U.S. and UK executive pay, see Martin J. Conyon et al., Are US CEOs Paid
More Than UK CEOs? Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay (The University of
Pennsylvania Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=907469; Martin J.
Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and
United Kingdom, 110 ECON. J. 640 (2000) (finding that in 1997 CEOs in the U.S. earned
45% higher cash compensation and 190% higher total compensation than CEOs in the UK).
For a comprehensive international comparison between CEOs in twelve OECD countries,
see John M. Abowd & Michael L. Bognanno, International Differences in Executive and
Managerial Compensation, in DIFFERENCES AND CHANGES IN WAGE STRUCTURES 67
(Richard B. Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz eds., 1995) (assessing data from 1984 to 1992
and finding U.S. CEO compensation exceeds that for CEOs in Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom).
40. See Ferri & Maber, supra note 18 (concluding that the policy objectives of the
legislation are being met, at least with respect to those companies with the most egregious
pay practices); see also William Hutchings & Mike Foster, Shareholder Voting Gets Rethink
in U.K., WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2009, at C5 (discussing proposed reforms to engage
shareholders in the long-term fiscal health of the firms in which they invest); cf. Jeffrey N.
Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case For
Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 323 (2009) (proposing a federal legislative provision
of a shareholder right to decide whether a public firm should opt in to an advisory
shareholder vote regime to clarify and unify existing state and federal law instead of the
proposed mandatory rule). The Wall Street Journal reported that Royal Dutch Shell PLC is
the largest among a growing group of British companies whose shareholders have voted
down compensation plans in advisory votes. Guy Chazan & Joann S. Lublin, Shell
Investors Revolt Over Executive Pay Plan, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2009, at B1; see also
Gordon, supra (comparing CEO compensation of Royal Dutch Shell PLC, Europe’s largest
oil company, and Exxon Mobil Corp., the largest U.S. oil company, and reporting that
European investors are angry over bonuses—$1.76 versus $17.6 million—that are relatively
modest by U.S. standards).
41. For instance, only days after the election of Barack Obama on November 4, 2008,
companies such as Sun Microsystems and Motorola voluntarily adopted “say on pay.” Ferri
& Weber, supra note 3. Between 2006 and 2008, proposals for the adoption of say on pay
had a high degree of support in compensation-related proposals. See Thomas & Martin,
supra note 26, at 1025 (stating that there is an average of 40% in favor); Marilyn F. Johnson
& Margaret B. Shackell, Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation (Michigan
State University Working Paper, Apr. 1997) (on file with authors) (examining the success of
“say on pay” proposals in the years 1992-95); see also Ferri & Weber, supra note 3, at 4

ANENSONFINALIZED_ONE_UPDATED

2010]

“CLEAN HANDS” AND THE CEO

9/9/2010 4:46 PM

961

executive compensation post-Enron, there has been a significant increase in
the frequency of pay-related proposals. 42 Shareholder activism aimed at
affecting the pay setting process like “say on pay” has had the highest
voting support and implementation rate compared to other proposals
concerning compensation.43 These initiatives, albeit aimed at targeted
firms, also influence the policy-making debate. 44
B.

Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation

Moreover, five years before the reform bills targeted executive
compensation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) attempted to
strengthen corporate accountability to shareholders.45 Then-President Bush
described the statute as “the most far-reaching reforms of American
(listing the 2008 shareholder proposals for say on pay). Prominent investor TIAA-CREF
has voted in favor of these measures. Thomas & Martin, supra note 26, at 1044.
Shareholder activists led by AFSCME (a union pension fund) also targeted more than 150
US firms with non-binding shareholder proposals requesting the adoption of “say on pay.”
Ferri & Maber, supra note 18, at 2 n.2.
42. See Yonca Ertimur et al., Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 11, 31 (working
paper, Apr. 2009) (on file with authors) (analyzing a sample of 134 vote-no campaigns and
1,198 shareholder proposals related to executive pay between 1997 and 2007).
43. Id. at 31. In addition to “say on pay,” process-oriented proposals include the ability
to expense stock options and a requirement to receive approval for golden parachutes. Id. at
11. Other kinds of compensation-related proposals seek to influence the outcome (i.e.,
performance-based vesting conditions) or objectives (i.e., link pay to social criteria) of the
pay setting process. See id. at 9-10 (characterizing such proposals as “pay design” and “pay
philosophy”).
44. Id. at 15, 25-26. Studies suggest that giving shareholders a greater voice in the
boardroom by an advisory vote on executive compensation further aligns owner-manager
interests, at least for those companies with inefficient executive compensation and relatively
poor corporate governance. Cai & Walkling, supra note 36, at 1 (“[S]uggest[ing] that the
market views say-on-pay as value-creating for the companies with inefficient executive
compensation and relatively poor corporate governance but value-destroying for other
companies.”). The success of such initiatives, however, has had little effect on the reduction
in CEO compensation overall. Ertimur et al., supra note 42, at 31. Nevertheless, studies
have found that other proposals seeking to influence the pay setting procedures as well pay
design have reduced CEO pay. See Fabrizio Ferri & Tatiana Sandino, The Impact of
Shareholder Activism on Financial Reporting and Compensation: The Case of Employee
Stock Options Expensing, 84 ACCT. REV. 433, 456 (2009) (reporting a $2.3 million reduction
in total CEO pay in firms after approval of proposals to expense employee stock options);
Ertimur, supra note 42, at 30 (demonstrating a causal link between labor union sponsored
proposals involving the design of executive pay like those linking pay and performance
from 2002-07 and a reduction in CEO pay by $1.5 million in firms with excess pay); see
also Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1770 (2008) (finding a $1 million CEO pay decline in firms
targeted by hedge fund activists).
45. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745-810 (codified at scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
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business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”46 In
signing the bill into law, he emphasized: “[T]his law says to every
American: There will not be a different ethical standard for corporate
America than the standard that applies to everyone else.” 47 Generally,
SOX and other post-scandal reforms of the stock exchanges and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) attempt to cure systemic
failures of corporate governance caused by faulty internal financial controls
and the lack of board independence.48 It is an effort to make management
more accountable, along with other gatekeepers and advisors, after
persistent and repeated “corporate looting by insiders”.49
As it relates to executive compensation, SOX prohibits loans to senior
officers. 50 If the corporation is required to file an accounting restatement
due to misconduct, SOX mandates that CEOs and CFOs return bonuses,
incentives, equity-based compensation, and certain profits from the sales of
securities. 51 It also prohibits executive officers from trading in the equity

46. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in
38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 183 (July 30, 2002).
47. Id.
48. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas: The
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 79, 86-87 (2005) (discussing the new role of the federal government in corporate
governance matters); LAUFER, supra note 8, at 39 (summarizing SOX provisions and the
reasons for them). Among other things, SOX requires the verification of financial
statements by CEOs and CFOs under threat of criminal sanction. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
7241 (2002) (requiring that company officers verify financial statements), 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(2002) (requiring that company officers verify financial statements or face criminal
penalties). It further directs the SEC and other federal agencies to promulgate additional
rules and regulations. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7233 (2002) (directing SEC to issue regulations
pertaining to audit procedures and creditor independence); 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002)
(directing the SEC to issue rules pertaining to professional responsibility of attorneys
practicing before the SEC). The internal financial controls provisions of SOX are part of a
broader mandate for issuers to establish and maintain disclosure controls and procedures to
ensure the quality of information in public reports. Some argue that the costs of the statute’s
internal financial control provisions outweigh its benefits. Henry N. Butler & Larry E.
Ribstein, The Sarbanes-Oxley Debacle: What We’ve Learned; How to Fix It, 38-42 (Mar.
13, 2006) (unpublished research paper prepared for the American Enterprise Institute, The
Liability Project).
49. LAUFER, supra note 8, at 39 n.272 (citing Richard Posner, The Economics of
Business Scandals and Financial Regulation (Oct. 2002) (unpublished manuscript)). See
generally Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection:
The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1153-54 (2003)
(discussing investor protection and corporate integrity as the central theme of reform).
50. Sarbanes-Oxley allows loans to officers made in the ordinary course of business.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(k).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (“If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement
due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any
financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and
chief financial officer of the company shall reimburse the issuer . . . .”).
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securities of their companies during an employee fund blackout period.52
Additionally, SOX grants the SEC authority to freeze corporate assets to
prevent the payment of bonuses to executives involving financial fraud. 53
Finally, it gives the SEC authority over board composition and committee
structure as well as the power to prohibit executives from serving as
corporate officers through administrative proceedings. 54
SOX’s panoply of prescriptions and requirement of reimbursement,
however, have had (at best) limited influence in preventing officers from
benefitting at the expense of their companies. The lack of enforcement of
the clawback provisions that mandate a return of executive pay in the event
of a restatement is particularly significant.55 Since its enactment, there
have been thousands of restatements and only twice has the SEC forced
executives to return their unfair share.56 Moreover, both cases involved
participation by the officer in the misconduct and alleged fraud.57 In a
recent (third) lawsuit, however, the SEC appears to be taking a more
aggressive approach to its clawback authority and has sought the forfeiture
of bonuses and stock sale profits from a former CEO after false accounting
by other executives caused the company to inflate earnings that led to a
restatement. 58 Shareholders have also instituted private lawsuits to fulfill
52. 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (2002).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2002).
54. 15 U.S. C. § 78j-l (2002); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(f).
55. See Rachael E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An
Underutilized Incentive to Keep the Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. LAW. 1, 5 (2008)
(advising that the largest portion of a CEO or CFO’s compensation, whether incentive-based
or equity-based, is potentially subject to section 304 (citing The WSJ 350: A Survey of CEO
Compensation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2007, at R1 and C.E.O. Pay: The New Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at BU10)).
56. Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2; see also id. at 13-14 (relaying that the SEC obtained
a “clawback” under this provision of $400 million in stock profits and incentive
compensation from William McGuire, the former CEO of UnitedHealth Group Inc. in 2007
and $190,000 in cash bonuses from Frances M. Jewels, former CFO of Sycamore Networks,
Inc. in 2008). The SEC has power under the securities laws (pre-SOX) to disgorge not only
profits but the base salary of the CEO. Id. at 32-33. Nevertheless, under this clawback
power, courts require the SEC to show that the misstatement resulted in the executive
obtaining money that he or she otherwise would not have received. Id. at 15. Executive
bonuses under SOX can be clawed back without regard to causation. Id.
57. Id. at 13-14. Both cases involved stock options backdating. Id.
58. See Phred Dvorak, SEC Orders Former CSK Auto Chief To Return Pay, WALL ST.
J., July 24, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124831208417074457.html (describing
lawsuit filed against Maynard Jenkins seeking the return of two years of performance-based
compensation paid as the result of falsely inflated earnings); David Scheer et al., SEC
Demands Ex-CSK Chief Forfeit Pay in Landmark Case (Update1), BLOOMBERG, July 23,
2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aqI28XZcPPHw
(predicting that the lawsuit against former CEO not involved in wrongdoing will up the ante
for other companies facing potential restatements). Rachael E. Schwartz, Senior Counsel
for the SEC’s Enforcement Division, criticized the SEC’s stringent reading of the statutory
language and argued for an expansive enforcement policy requiring repayment regardless of
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the statutory policy of restitution, but they have been universally rebuffed
by the federal courts. 59
C.

Federal Securities Law

The disclosure provisions of federal securities legislation have a
similar purpose: to deter abusive practices by corporate managers such as
excessive compensation.60 The SEC has regulated the disclosure of
executive pay packages since the securities laws were enacted and
continues to update and increase the disclosed amount of executive
In addition to reorganizing the mandated
compensation data. 61
scienter, knowledge, or any participation in the wrongdoing. See generally Schwartz, supra
note 55 (describing SOX obligations for executive compensation); see also id. at 5 (noting
that section 304 explicitly authorizes the SEC to create an exemption for any circumstance
in which the proposed application of section 304 might cause injustice such as when a CEO
is powerless to prevent the wrong doing of low-level employees). For an alternative view,
see John Patrick Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Case for a
Personal Culpability Requirement, 59 BUS. LAW. 1005 (2004) (describing the potential for
personal liability in executive compensation cases).
59. Neither the company nor any of its shareholders can sue to enforce section 304;
only the SEC may bring an action. Schwartz, supra note 55, at 2; see also id. at 2 n.4 (citing
lower district court cases rejecting a private cause of action under the clawback provision of
Sarbanes-Oxley).
60. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Excessive Executive Compensation—Why
Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 277, 284 (2007) (“One of the federal securities’ laws’
principal targets of reform was excess executive compensation.”); see also George T.
Washington, The Corporate Executive’s Living Wage, 54 HARV. L. REV. 733, 734-35 (1941)
(depicting how corporate executives increased their salaries to compensate for the reduction
in bonuses after the 1929 stock market crash while laying off thousands of workers). One of
the architects of the 1933 Securities Act, Felix Frankfurter, explained its intended “in
terrorem” effect:
The existence of bonuses, of excessive commissions and salaries, of preferential
lists and the like, may all be open secrets among the knowing, but the knowing
are few. There is a shrinking quality to such transactions; to force knowledge of
them into the open is largely to restrain their happening.
Felix Frankfurter, Securities Act—Social Consequences, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55.
61. The SEC’s authority over executive compensation stems from Sections 3(b), 6, 7,
10, and 19(a) of the 1933 Securities Act, as amended, Sections 10(b), 12, 13, 14, 15(d) and
23(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act, as amended, and Sections 8, 20(a), 24(a), 30 and 38 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended. 71 Fed. Reg. at 6598 (Feb. 8, 2006). The
SEC first regulated executive pay disclosures in 1938. Exchange Act Release No. 34-1823
(Aug. 11, 1938). The 1992 Regulations included a Performance Graph and Compensation
Committee Report which detailed compensation and corporate performance, as reflected in
the stock price. Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6962,
57 Fed. Reg. 48126 (Oct. 21, 1992); Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securityholder
Lists and Mailing Requests, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7032, 58 Fed. Reg. 63010, at sec.
II (commenting that amendments were intended to make compensation disclosure clearer,
more comprehensive and useful to shareholders). The 1996 Regulations are discussed infra
notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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compensation materials, the most recent regulations require that
management reveal retirement and severance packages and outstanding
equity interests. 62 The regulations also establish a minimum federal
threshold of $10,000 as a trigger for disclosing perks. 63 In the words of
SEC Chairman Cox, its job is “to help investors keep an eye on how much
of their money is being paid to top executives who work for them.” 64
Nevertheless, the SEC focuses on wage information, not wage
controls (which it leaves to state corporate law). 65 While the SEC may
enforce the disclosure requirements against companies for misleading
compensation information, it does not set CEO compensation or provide a
formula for determining it.66
Consequently, notwithstanding the value of increased transparency,
critics have challenged the SEC to undertake a more meaningful role in
policing compensation decisions.67 Given that the regulations do not
62. 71 Fed. Reg. 53,183-89 (Jan. 3, 2006) (summarizing the regulations).
63. Id.; Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements
Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters (July 26, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm. Along with compensation matters, the
regulations also address related party transactions, director independence, and corporate
governance. 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Jan. 3, 2005).
64. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech by SEC Chairman: Chairman’s Opening
Statement; Proposed Revisions to the Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure
Rules (Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706cc.htm.
65. Id. Chairman Cox explains: “It is [the shareholders’ and directors’] job, not the
government’s, to determine how best to align executive compensation with corporation
performance, to determine the appropriate levels of executive pay, and to decide on the
metrics for determining it.” Id; see also Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information
Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418
(2003) (discussing the limits of increased disclosure in that it assumes there is an ability to
use the information); Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws:
Opting Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519,
534 (1999) (noting that disclosure has been the central focus of the federal agency
structure).
66. Id.; see also SEC Release, supra note 63 (SEC questioning the effectiveness of its
regulations that require corporations to furnish compensation reports rather than file them
such that Exchange Act liability for misstatements would attach). For SEC enforcement
actions, see, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2005 Performance and
Accountability Report, at 2, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2005.shtml
(noting settlement with Tyson Foods and its former CEO, Donald Tyson, who collectively
paid a penalty of $2.2 million for misleading disclosures of compensation information).
There are still ample reports of companies disguising executive pay packages. See, e.g.,
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits, 1
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 291 (2004) (advising that corporate boards have been camouflaging
compensation through retirement benefits and other payments); Patrick McGeehan, Options
in the Mirror, Bigger Than They Seem, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, sec. 3, at 6 (commenting
on how Lehman Brothers obscured executive compensation through stock option grants and
valuation).
67. See Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing the SECs
Efforts to Regulate Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481 (2007) (urging the
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provide a remedy for shareholders who object to compensation practices,
commentators conclude that current SEC regulations are incapable of
solving the executive pay problem. 68
In lieu of government enforcement, private lawsuits are available
under the securities laws for misleading disclosures. Such lawsuits offer
another means of enforcing officer accountability for financial
misconduct. 69 The availability of a private right to sue “encourages
investors, bolsters capital markets, and facilitates economic growth.” 70
While there is ongoing debate about the impact of private litigation
upon capital markets, 71 liabilities for securities fraud have become a
globally accepted phenomenon. 72 In particular, foreign securities regimes

SEC to go further than its longstanding disclosure approach to executive compensation
based on the broad protections for board decisions over compensation under state corporate
law); cf. Philip C. Berg, The Limits of SEC Authority Under Section 14(a) of the Exchange
Act: Where Federal Disclosure Ends and State Corporate Governance Begins, 17 J. CORP.
L. 311 (1992) (discussing ways the SEC can undertake proxy reform).
68. Markham, supra note 60; Martin, supra note 67; see also Lucien Bebchuk, The
SEC:
Beyond
Disclosure,
FORBES,
Jan.
19,
2006,
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/2006/01/18/sec-executive-comp-comment-cx_lb_0119bebchuk.html
(asserting that requirements by the SEC that companies disclose executive compensation
schemes will not fix the problem of executive compensation alone). There has been an
extensive and longstanding discussion about the merits of disclosure as opposed to direct
conduct controls. See Alison Grey Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities
Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 325 (1974) (arguing that substantive
regulation is the best means of deterring undesirable practices); John C. Coffee Jr., Beyond
the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective
Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1115 (1977) (“Disinfectants are not, after all, a
universal panacea; sometimes surgery is required.”); William O. Douglas, Protecting the
Investor, 23 YALE L.J. 522, 528 (1934) (noting the effectiveness of conduct regulation).
The tax laws have also been criticized as ineffective in checking executive compensation.
Markham, supra note 60, at 287-91; see also Sarah Anderson et al., Executive Excess 2008:
How Average Taxpayers Subsidize Runaway Pay, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. & UNITED FOR A
FAIR ECON, Aug. 25, 2008, at 5 (finding that tax subsidies related to executive pay total $20
billion and that Congressional reforms targeting the loopholes have stalled in the face of
opposition from corporate lobby groups).
69. There is a right to sue under section 10(b). 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2002), 17 C.F.R.
§240.10b-5(2007). See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988) (“Judicial
interpretation and application, legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time have
removed any doubt that a private cause of action exists for a violation of § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, and constitutes an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act’s requirements.”).
70. See Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme
Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 681 (2008) (reporting results of an empirical study (citing
FRANK B. CROSS & ROBERT A. PRENTICE, LAW AND CORPORATE FINANCE 182 (2007))); id. at
680 n.305 (showing there is extensive literature arguing that robust securities regimes
facilitate capital markets and spur economic growth).
71. See id. at 678 (finding the “case for encouraging such suits is no less persuasive
than the case for discouraging them”).
72. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775,
832-38 (2006) (showing that developed economies emulate most of the core attributes of
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have been sensitive to the need for executive accountability. 73 This
worldwide concern reflects President Roosevelt’s belief that the securities
laws were for the “protection of investors [and] for the safeguarding of
values.” 74
Yet recent scandals involving collateralized debt obligations and
options backdating have challenged the effectiveness of securities laws.75
Amidst urgent calls for accountability to shareholders, federal courts are
struggling to fashion an analytically sound rubric of liability in civil
securities fraud suits. 76 To make matters worse, a recent decision by the
U.S. Supreme Court has signaled that federal courts are limiting liability
exposure in the securities arena.77 As a result, courts will not invent

U.S. securities regulation).
73. See Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, 23 WISC.
INT’L L.J. 367, 401-02 (2005) (discussing Australia’s increase in executive accountability);
Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud As Corporate Governance:
Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 876-77 (2003) (describing federal
disclosure laws in the United States that impose governance duties on corporate officers).
74. 78 CONG. REC. 2264 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1934) (Message From Pres. Roosevelt)
(providing reasons for the enactment of the Exchange Act of 1934); see also Prentice, supra
note 70, at 682 (“President Roosevelt perceived securities regulation as largely a moral
question rather than an economic one.” (citing JAMES E. SARGEANT, ROOSEVELT AND THE
HUNDRED DAYS: STRUGGLE FOR THE EARLY NEW DEAL 221 (1981)))).
75. See, e.g., Jay R. Ritter, Forensic Finance, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 127 (2008).
76. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Proportionate Liability, Contribution
Rights, and Settlement Effects, 51 BUS. LAW. 1157, 1165-66 (1996) (noting the fine line
between levels of intent). Two types of securities litigation are typical: insider trading and
misleading disclosures. In the latter case, a corporate officer makes a false or misleading
statement about an important product line or financial matter such as quarterly earnings in
the corporation’s favor that inflates the stock price. When the truth is discovered, a class of
investors sues the corporation and key officers for fraud under Section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Under either scenario, scholars are attempting to
make sense of contradictory court decisions. See generally Patricia S. Abril & Ann M.
Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81 (suggesting that
the scienter may reside other than with the officer who utters the misrepresentation); Regina
F. Burch, “Unfit to Serve” Post-Enron, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1081, 1084 (2008) (arguing that
non-management directors’ reckless failures to respond to red flags may amount to an
intentional omission of material information in violation of Rule 10b-5); Hugh C. Beck, The
Substantive Limits of Liability for Inaccurate Predictions, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 161 (2007)
(advocating a falsity-driven analysis of the PSLRA’s safe harbor’s “meaningful cautionary
statements” requirement); Ann M. Olazábal & Patricial S. Abril, The Ubiquity of Greed: A
Contextual Model for Analysis of Scienter, 60 FLA. L. REV. 401 (2008) (extending the stock
sales model to create a rubric for consideration of adequacy of allegations of motive and
opportunity in 10b-5 complaints).
77. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, v. Scientific-Atlantic, 55 U.S. 148 (2008) (refusing to
recognize liability for knowing participation in securities fraud by parties who make no
misleading statements upon which the public could have relied under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5); see also Tony Mauro, Justices Skeptical of Investor Class Actions, LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007 (calling it “the securities fraud case of the decade”); Nicholas
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liabilities to capture fraud as they once did.78 One commentator has
concluded that the Court’s decision was clear that federal courts are to sit
on the sidelines despite the ever artful and creative business methods that
have, and will continue, to breed new instances of fraud or other financial
misconduct. 79 Congress alone must now act swiftly and with prescience to
provide adequate investor protection.80
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s stance vis-à-vis securities
legislation parallels its recent refusal to recognize remedies in other
commercial cases.81 The effect of this jurisprudence is to further
Rummell, Supremes to Weigh in on Vendor Liability for Fraud, FIN. WK., Oct. 8, 2007,
available
at
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071008/REG/71005025
(characterizing the case as “the Roe v. Wade of securities law”).
78. See Prentice, supra note 70, at 639-40 (reviewing prior securities fraud litigation as
well as other fraud jurisprudence to show that neither the Supreme Court nor state or lower
federal courts distinguished between primary and secondary liability). Robert Prentice
explains: “These ‘A helps B fool C’ schemes are hardly new inventions. Until Stoneridge,
they had always been punished rather than rationalized as typical business operations.” Id.
at 615.
79. See id. at 677 (noting that a “stinting definition of fraud provides crooks with a road
map for getting away with the most egregious of schemes”); accord John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the ‘Evolution’ of a White-Collar Crime,
21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983) (“If we freeze the evolution of the [mail fraud] statute,
new forms of predatory behavior will appear to which the legislature cannot realistically be
expected to respond quickly.”); see also Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 20 (explaining that the
complexities of securities can make financial markets more susceptible to fraud); cf. Samuel
W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1972 (2006) (commenting on the
flexibility of legislative and common law fraud given that it “will always confront novel
economic practices that have not previously been classified as fraudulent”).
80. See Prentice, supra note 70, at 612-13 (criticizing those praising the decision for its
judicial restraint (citing Paul S. Atkins, Stoneridge and the Rule of Law, WALL ST. J., Jan.
25, 2008, at A14)).
81. See Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002)
(denying an insurance company equitable relief in the form of forcing another party to pay
money since such a remedy would be a legal one); Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 324 (1999) (reversing a trial court’s grant of
injunctive relief on the basis that such relief exceeded the trial court’s jurisdiction); see also
Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 224, 253–55 (2003) (criticizing the court’s restrictive reading of its
own power in relationship to Congress and explaining that the Grupo Mexico and GreatWest Life cases are part of a jurisprudential trend in other areas); accord The Supreme
Court, Term—Leading Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 200, 317 (1999) (characterizing the Grupo
Mexico decision as a “cramped understanding” of the powers of federal courts). While
these two decisions involved equitable remedies and have generated commentary on the
perceived power of the federal courts over equity, Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the
Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291 (2000) (critiquing Grupo Mexico and emphasizing the
interdependence of law and equity in social progress), more recent decisions sanctioning
dismissals on the basis of discretionary equitable defenses demonstrate that the Supreme
Court’s position on remedies has less to do with equity and more to do with its place within
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discourage Congress from looking to federal courts as a means of enforcing
a national agenda.
Given the more limited role of the federal courts in protecting
investors from fraudsters (or from adequately responding in other business
disputes) as well as the SEC’s narrow mandate regarding executive pay
packages, state courts should continue to “step into the breach” left by
federal law in their time-honored role as guardians of public policy. 82 As
discussed below in Part III, there is controversy over the effectiveness of
state court litigation concerning excessive executive compensation.83
Combating executive pay abuses in the context of an unclean hands defense
would help fulfill the promise of state courts as the primary purveyors of
public policy and assist existing and proposed federal law in reaching its
goals of shareholder and stakeholder accountability. Therefore, the
doctrine of “clean hands” provides a more complete response to executive
compensation schemes that are potentially lethal to companies and their
constituents.
III. STATE CORPORATION LAW
Dismissals for unclean hands in breach of contract cases, brought by
errant executives, support the long-standing view of holding state law as
the primary regulator of the corporation.84 Corporations are not only
created under state law, but their internal affairs are also governed by state

the federal political system. Accord Prentice, supra note 70, at 612-13 (concluding that the
court’s decision in Stoneridge was “an activist opinion driven primarily by undisguised and
quite debatable policy preferences”); Resnik, supra, at 225 (characterizing, in a similar
manner, the Court’s jurisprudence as motivated by judicial policy preferences). See
generally Robert J. Aalberts & T. Leigh Anenson, Discretionary Limits on Statutes of
Limitations: A Defense of Laches (working paper, on file with authors) (analyzing Supreme
Court equity cases).
82. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of the New Century: Common Law Courts
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (1995) (discussing how
state courts are answering Justice Brennan’s call to “step into the breach” and interpreting
their state constitutions more expansively than the federal constitution in the inaugural
Brennan Lecture delivered at the New York University School of Law (quoting William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 503 (1977))).
83. See infra Part III; cf. LAUFER, supra note 8, at 40 (discussing how New York state
criminal law closed the regulatory gaps of federal law in the area of excessive executive
compensation during the post-Enron era).
84. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of state law,
and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”); see also Martin,
supra note 67, at 537 (“Challenges to executive compensation decision making logically
reside in state law . . . .”).
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statutory default rules. 85 Moreover, a well-developed body of state case
law regulates the relationship between shareholders and management. 86
Because states have not amended corporate statutory provisions to address
abusive executive pay practices, litigation challenging the strength of the
owner-management connection has been the primary means of correcting
executive compensation.87 Typically, such lawsuits are brought by
shareholders on behalf of the corporation and seek to hold directors
personally liable for waste and breaching their fiduciary duties.88
It is axiomatic that corporate directors have a direct fiduciary
relationship with the entities they serve and an indirect fiduciary
relationship with the shareholders. 89 One of the most important purposes of
corporate fiduciary law is to instill trust in management behavior for the
benefit of the shareholders and the public.90 Invocation of unclean hands in
85. Suggestions for state statutory reform to curb excessive executive compensation
have included shareholder approval (binding or nonbinding) of executive compensation
packages or at least of contracts with such specific features, allowance for shareholder
resolutions on executive pay policies that are binding on the board, and permitting greater
shareholder involvement in the selection of directors. LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M.
FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION 198 (2004). There is also the possibility of establishing corporate bylaws
concerning executive compensation. Thomas & Martin, supra note 26, at 1047-49.
86. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 12 (discussing the development of fiduciary
duty law).
87. In response to an earlier Delaware decision, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 1985), Delaware and other states have amended their general corporation law to
permit corporations to include a provision in their certificate of incorporation to exculpate
directors from personal liability for breaching their duty of care (although not their duty of
loyalty or the newly recognized duty of good faith). For example, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Van Gorkom, and subsequent cases like In re Walt Disney Co., infra
notes 96-102, have received a high level of scholarly attention due to the implications of
their holdings. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 54 (2002) (discussing the role of a corporation’s
board from a legal and practical perspective).
88. Martin, supra note 67; see also John W. Murrey, III, Excessive Compensation in
Publicly Held Corporations: Is the Doctrine of Waste Still Applicable?, 108 W. VA. L. REV.
433 (2005) (discussing the waste doctrine in the context of excessive executive
compensation).
89. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 12, at 257-58 (“Shareholders entrust control of
their property to the directors who are charged with overall management of the corporation.
They expect those who manage the companies they invest in to produce value, and they
anticipate a share in the benefit derived from their capital.” (citing Lawrence E. Mitchell,
Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 430 (1993))).
90. Mitchell, supra note 89, at 430; see also Larry Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 553, 556 (2001) (“Trust can be seen simply as a decision by one person to give power
over his person or property to another in exchange for a return promise.”). Mitchell notes
that in the corporate context, “[t]he power and control that are present in all fiduciary
relationships are exaggerated . . . because the indeterminate length of the enterprise and the
practically infinite array of investment opportunities for the corporation make any
possibility of specified limitations on directors’ power or ongoing control by the
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response to executive overreaching in contract cases strengthens the
primary role of states as the custodian of corporate integrity and
governance. 91 It also represents a complementary response to the current
crisis of corporate trust and supports state fiduciary duty law. 92 Fiduciary
duties are rooted in ancient equity and are often emphasized with respect to
the importance of the preservation of equity in the modern commercial
world. 93
Still, the saga of shareholder derivative litigation has not been a
surefire way to cure executive excesses. During the Great Depression, the
first in a series of high profile cases challenged the outrageous
compensation packages paid to industry moguls as a breach of directorial
duties and showed some promise in stemming excessive executive pay. 94
Such lawsuits have been ongoing ever since, especially during recessionary
periods like now, when CEO paychecks outpace those of the average
worker and corporate earnings. 95

stockholders unrealistic.” Id.
91. See Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1233, 1235 (2003) (commenting that Enron “serves as a ‘perfect storm’ metaphor
that the checks and balances in the American system of corporate governance are not
working . . . .”). For articles discussing the pros and cons of directorial fiduciary duties, see
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1267-68
(1999); Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 394 (2005); Charles
Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and the Business
Judgment Rule, A Commentary, 41 BUS. LAW. 1237, 1245 (1986); E. Norman Veasey, A
Perspective on Liability Risks to Directors in Light of Current Events, INSIGHTS, Feb. 2005,
at 15.
92. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 12, at 261 (“The shenanigans of senior
executives in combination with the oversight failures of directors generated a crisis in
corporate trust.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility,
70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 957, 965-66 (2002) (discussing ways through which an ethic of
corporate responsibility may be reinstated); see also Lyman Johnson, After Enron:
Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 72 (2004)
(arguing that “a moral vocabulary has been, and should remain, central to corporate law
discourse”).
93. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 393 (3rd ed. 2005);
William Gummow, Conclusion, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW 515, 518 (James Edelman
& Simone Degeling eds., 2005); Lionel Smith, Fusion and Tradition, in EQUITY IN
COMMERCIAL LAW, supra, at 19, 30.
94. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933) (finding that executive pay could
become excessive and amount to waste and constitute a breach of fiduciary duties); see also
Markham, supra note 60, at 281-83 (detailing cases involving American Tobacco Company,
Bethlehem Steel, and National City Bank).
95. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive
Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 571 (2001) (examining 124 cases
where shareholders have brought claims of excessive compensation and concluding that
shareholders are more likely to find success against smaller corporations when litigating
outside of Delaware).
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The effectiveness of fiduciary duty litigation over CEO compensation
schemes was spotlighted recently in Delaware. In the seminal case of In re
Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, the Supreme Court of
Delaware affirmed the Chancery Court’s recognition of a new duty of good
faith in executive pay practices.96 The Delaware Court of Chancery had
declared that, in addition to the traditional duties of care and loyalty,
directors must have honesty of purpose and “a true faithfulness and
devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”97
The creation of this fiduciary principle of good faith arose in the
decade-long shareholder derivative litigation over the hiring and firing of
Michael Ovitz by his long-time friend and Disney CEO, Michael Eisner.98
Shareholders sought to recover against the directors after they paid Ovitz
some $130 million in compensation (including a termination payout) for
his abysmal one-year performance. 99 Despite advising corporate counsel
and the compensation committee to hire experts and follow best practices,
the chancellor ultimately determined that no breach of duties had occurred
by the Disney directors under the circumstances, and the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed that decision.100
The case has sparked a firestorm of controversy over the already
burning question of CEO compensation. 101 It has been lauded for creating
96. 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). The shareholder
derivative litigation involving The Walt Disney Company produced six court opinions. See
Duggin & Goldman, supra note 12, at 215 n.14 (recounting the decisions and their
holdings).
97. Id. at 755, aff'd, 906 A.2d at 67. For a pre-Disney discussion of Delaware’s
emerging good faith duty, see Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
456 (2004); see also E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399 (2005) (recounting developments in Delaware’s
corporate law, including the duty of good faith, by former Delaware Supreme Court Chief
Justice Veasey during his tenure on the court).
98. Disney, 906 A.2d at 35-46.
99. Id. at 35.
100. Id.; Disney, 907 A.2d at 760 n.487 (albeit describing Disney’s business practices as
that of “an imperial CEO” operating with a “supine or passive board”). For instance, the
compensation committee used an expert consultant, compared Ovitz’s options to others it
had approved for other executives, and knew the downside protection of $150 to $200
million Ovitz was seeking before leaving his company. Disney, 906 A.2d at 56-59; see also
Martin, supra note 67, at 500-01 (comparing Disney and Van Gorkom and concluding that
the Delaware Supreme Court was consistent in its rulings).
101. See generally Duggin & Goldman, supra note 12 (discussing the “new” duty of
good faith); see also Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric
in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 7-8 (2005) (“The duty of good faith
emerged in an environment of sturm und drang in corporate governance, when a series of
scandals—including frauds and failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia, celebrity
insider trading, and corruption in the IPO market—drew American corporate governance
into question and plunged previously settled questions into heated debate.”). For a
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the obligation of good faith in setting executive pay levels.102 But it has
also renewed calls for all courts to increase the level of scrutiny of board
decisions in an effort to encourage directors to negotiate more “defensible”
packages with CEOs. 103
As a defense in a contract suit against the company, unclean hands
avoids the lenient review of board decisions under existing fiduciary duty
law. Moreover, whether the outcome in Disney denotes the diminishing
utility of fiduciary duty litigation in compensation cases, the recognition of
an obligation of good faith provides at least the potential for extra
protection from abusive pay practices in the future.104 Dismissals under the
“clean hands” doctrine for excessive executive compensation support the
board’s good faith duty to monitor and oversee officers by allowing them
to deny payment without incurring contract liability on behalf of the
company. 105 It would encourage directors not to negotiate absurdly
fantastic compensation schemes in the first place and sustain their refusal to
pay contracted-for compensation under circumstances of executive
malfeasance. 106
Concomitantly, with the availability of the “clean hands” doctrine, the
directors’ failure to invoke the defense under circumstances amounting to

description of how Delaware became the “center of the corporate universe” authored by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware, see E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the
Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. REV. 163, 166-67 (2004).
102. See generally Martin, supra note 67 (discussing the positive element of the Disney
ruling establishing the duty of good faith).
103. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 95, at 599-600 (discussing standards of review in
executive compensation cases); see also Martin, supra note 67, at 537-38 (describing
opportunities for stricter review in state courts); accord GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF
EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES (1991) (proposing that courts
use an intermediate level of scrutiny in reviewing compensation packages); Linda J. Barris,
The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68
IND. L.J. 59, 87 (1992) (discussing the standard of “reasonableness” in such cases); Detlev
Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP.
L. 231, 252-61 (1983) (reviewing case law on executive compensation and review); Charles
M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1867, 1897-99 (1992) (describing how a change in standards of review might influence
corporate action).
104. Contra Markham, supra note 60, at 284 (claiming that courts are institutionally
unable to deal with the issue of excessive compensation paid to executives).
105. See, e.g., Press Release, Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Corporate Directors Give
Executive Pay Models Mixed Reviews (June 20, 2006), available at
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID=16180 (finding in a worldwide survey that
61% of directors think that executives are overpaid).
106. See Jones v. Harris Assoc. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (noting the “feeble incentives of boards of directors to police compensation”
(citing, e.g., Ivan E. Brick et al., CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm
Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 403 (2006))), cert. granted, 129
S.Ct. 1579, 173 L.Ed.2d 675 (Mar 09, 2009) (No. 08-586).
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excess pay may be a violation of their fiduciary duty. The extra threat of
liability should incentivize them to act in the best interests of the
company. 107 Shareholder activism and even public indignation, also
proving an effective deterrent against executive excesses in the pay setting
process, should additionally motivate directorial diligence in seeking refuge
from contract overreaching with unclean hands.108
Used in this way, the doctrine of “clean hands” provides an extra line
of defense against avaricious executives and incentivizes directors to do the
right thing regarding the negotiation and execution of officer pay packages.
While neither the market nor the law alone has been effective in keeping
directors faithful to their fiduciary responsibilities, 109 the defense of
unclean hands provides an additional weapon in the corporate arsenal to
combat executive greed and its toxic consequences to company
stakeholders.
IV. EVOLUTION OF EQUITY
Along with advancing the common goal of management
accountability found in state corporation law and federal legislation,
defeating excessive compensation by applying the “clean hands” doctrine
preserves the traditional purpose and use of the defense. Court utilization
of unclean hands also curtails unethical business practices in contract cases
and continues the modern doctrinal trend in extending the defense to
damages actions. It additionally reinforces the time-honored role of equity
in maintaining the integrity of the law.

107. A strengthening of existing fiduciary law (through higher level scrutiny or
otherwise) would be beneficial to encourage directors with respect to contract compensation
decisions. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for
Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1382 (2007) (advocating court use
of prediction markets in fiduciary duty litigation to assess board decisions over how much to
pay the CEO).
108. See Ertimur et al., supra note 42, at 27-30 (explaining how shareholder activism can
act as a catalyst for change by inspiring other investors, the press, and even independent
directors who have been targeted in vote-no campaigns); discussion supra notes 43-45 and
accompanying text (discussing rates of implementation of shareholder proposals and
reduction in CEO pay); see also John E. Core et al., The Power of the Pen and Executive
Compensation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 1-25 (2008) (studying the determinants and effect of
negative compensation-related press coverage).
For additional evidence of board
responsiveness to shareholder activism, see infra Part VI.B.
109. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1747-53 (2001) (suggesting trust
is a more important factor in business decisions than fear of legal or market sanctions).
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Role of Ancient Equity in Commercial Cases

It must be emphasized that it was through courts not legislatures that
society originally received protection from scandalous commercial
practices. For example, when the common law courts failed to stop
defendants from being made to pay twice on the collection of a note under
seal, equity was there.110 When the common law judges turned a blind eye
to mistakes in the formation of contracts or in the unfairness of their
execution, equity again intervened. 111 Over time, these equitable principles
became so well-regarded that the common law courts adopted them as their
own. 112 To be sure, the absorption of equity has been extensive enough that
lawyers and lay persons alike consider “equity” to be a synonym for
110. See 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 20, 27 n.16 (5th ed.
1941) (describing how the debtor would be required to pay multiple times on the same debt
due to the absence of the defense of accord and satisfaction under the rigid common law);
RALPH A. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 26 (1961) (“If one paid a
debt expressed in a sealed instrument without obtaining an acquittance, he could be made to
pay again.”).
111. The following areas were also in need of equitable protection from the strict
common law:
A person who injured another in self-defense must pay damages for the battery;
he was also guilty of a crime. Killing by accident was a crime.
Misrepresentation was not protected against by existing forms of action. A
wife’s property belonged to her husband during coverture. . . . Only contracts in
the form of covenants under seal were enforced, and even in such cases the
common law courts gave relief only if the breach involved an affirmative act.
The theory of dependent promises was as yet undreamed of, and recovery for
unjust enrichment was four centuries away.
T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27
REV. LITIG. 377, 380 n.5 (2008) (quoting NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 25–26); see also
ROBERT MEGARRY & P.V. BAKER, SNELL’S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 12 (27th ed. 1973) (“A
plaintiff who had obtained a judgment in his favour in a court of law might be prevented
from enforcing it by a ‘common injunction’ granted by the Court of Chancery, because in
the opinion of the latter court he had obtained the judgment unfairly.”); Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Early English Equity, 1 L.Q. REV. 162, 162-63 (1885) (discussing substantive
doctrines developed in chancery).
112. Evidence of these equitable principles can be seen in Spect v. Spect:
The distinction between strict law and equity is never in any country a
permanent distinction. Law and equity are in continual progression, and the
former is constantly gaining ground upon the latter. A great part of what is now
strict law was formerly considered as equity, and the equitable decisions of this
age will unavoidably be ranked under the strict law of the next (internal citation
omitted).
26 P. 203, 205 (Cal. 1891) (quoting Lord Redesdale explaining the equitable penetration of
the common law); Robert S. Stevens, A Plea for the Extension of Equitable Principles and
Remedies, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 351, 354 (1956) (discussing the law’s adoption of equitable
principles); see also discussion infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text (discussing
common law absorption of many equitable defenses in contract law).
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fairness. 113 Simply put, “[i]t is a question of ethics.” 114
It is true that since the rise of the regulatory state during the early
twentieth century, protection from fraud and other nefarious commercial
practices has fallen within the domain of legislation. But public protection
from unethical conduct did not begin with the financial fraud and dubious
ethical practices that ushered in the Great Depression and inspired the
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. 115 Nor did it originate in the previous
century with the enactment of the anti-trust laws to bust the powerful
113. See, e.g., Rauscher v. City of Lincoln, 691 N.W.2d 844, 852 (Neb. 2005) (“Equity
is determined on a case-by-case basis when justice and fairness so require.”); Clark v.
Teeven Holding Co., 625 A.2d 869, 878 (Del. Ch. 1992) (“The use of the term ‘equitable
principles’ . . . is merely equivalent to the words ‘principles of fairness or justice.’”); Ohio
St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Frantz, 555 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ohio 1990) (indicating that justice is
the objective of equity); see also MEGARRY & BAKER, supra note 111, at 6 (noting that, in
modern English statutes, provisions relating to what is “equitable” are usually construed to
mean what is “fair”); Donald Nichols & Chandra Subramaniam, Executive Compensation:
Excessive or Equitable?, 29 J. BUS. ETHICS 339, 340 (2001) (equating equity with fairness in
the context of CEO compensation); Roger Young & Stephen Spitz, SUEM—Spitz’s Ultimate
Equitable Maxim: In Equity, Good Guys Should Win and Bad Guys Should Lose, 55 S.C. L.
REV. 175, 178 (2003) (commenting that the basic orthodoxy of equity is that “[the] good
guys should win and [the] bad guys should lose”). Indeed, it was the perception that parallel
court systems were applying similar substantive rules under different procedural processes
that led to the idea of integration. See William Searle Holdsworth, Blackstone’s Treatment
of Equity, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1930) (reviewing the discussion between Lord Mansfield
and Blackstone about the procedural and substantive differences in law and equity); Thomas
O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 464
(2003) (discussing the merger of the law and equity regimes and the importance of
maintaining equitable principles).
114. Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill 215, 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); see also Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., Foreword to SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY 59 (Edward D. Re ed., 1955) (commenting
that equity courts “mainly clothed moral values with legal sanctions”). Every chancellor
from 1380 to 1488 was a church official. Thomas Edward Scrutton, Roman Law Influence
in Chancery, Church Courts, Admiralty, and Law Merchant, in SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 208, 214–15 (Ass’n of Am. Law Schs. ed., 1907); see also
Henry Arthur Hollond, Some Early Chancellors, 9 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 17, 23 (1945)
(indicating that the position was held by laymen for only about twelve years during the
fourteenth century). As an ecclesiastic, the official was trained in Canon and moral law.
Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV.
779, 780 (1945) (discussing the long line of bishops and archbishops serving as
chancellors). Non-clerical chancellors were drawn from the ranks of the common lawyers
beginning in the sixteenth century. MEGARRY & BAKER, supra note 111, at 9; see also
Glenn & Redden, supra, at 779 (advising that Sir Thomas Moore was the first lawyer to be
Lord Chancellor in 1529).
115. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2002); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2002). See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
388-89 (1983) (explaining that the purpose of the securities laws was “to rectify perceived
deficiencies in the available common law protections by establishing higher standards of
conduct in the securities industry”); Prentice, supra note 70, at 619, 623 (noting that the
securities laws were meant to strengthen the common law and citing additional lower
federal court cases).
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railroad trusts. 116
Rather, protection from unethical conduct began in England during the
Middle Ages when chancellors and, eventually, equity courts applied moral
principles to achieve justice during a time when the “‘might makes right’
mentality was once the conscience of kings and nobles.”117 Since the rise
of the modern corporation, corporate directors have become the new
aristocracy and have crowned CEOs king. 118 It does not take too much
imagination to recognize how medieval history bears an eerie resemblance
to the present day events. Moreover, given that the public power vacuum
left by foreign governments is being filled by private multinational

116. See George F. Canfield, Is a Large Corporation an Illegal Combination or
Monopoly under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act?, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 95, 108 (1909) (discussing
the treatment of railroad companies under the anti-trust laws); Thomas S. Ulen, Cartels and
Regulation: Late Nineteenth Century Railroad Collusion and the Creation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, 40 J. ECON. HIST. 179 (1980) (same); see also FRIEDMAN, supra
note 93, at 390 (citing the technological advances of the nineteenth century as first providing
corporations—initially the railroads—a commanding position in the economy). President
Theodore Roosevelt pressed for greater corporate accountability and an even more
expanded role for the federal government in the oversight of big business. President
Roosevelt Speaks on Trusts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1903, at 1; see, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (finding that the defendant’s practices
constituted a restraint of trade); United States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U.S. 106
(1911) (same).
117. Anenson, supra note 111, at 386 (quoting WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON
EQUITY 99–100 (1930)); see also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD III act 5, sc. 2 (“Every
man’s conscience is a thousand men.”). Legal and the ethical principles were not separate
concepts during the formative stages of the common law legal system. See George Burton
Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87, 91 (1916), reprinted in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY 1, 5 (Edward D. Re ed., 1955) (“Common Law and Equity
originated together as one undifferentiated system in the effort of the king to carry out his
duty of furnishing security and justice . . . .”); William F. Walsh, Equity Prior to the
Chancellor’s Court, 17 GEO. L.J. 97, 100–06 (1929) (finding the roots of equity
administration beginning with nobility); see also H. D. Hazeltine, The Early History of
English Equity, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY: READ BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS
OF HISTORICAL STUDIES HELD IN LONDON IN 1913, at 261–85 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1913)
(providing examples of equity-like ethical principles in the common law). The High Court
of Chancery emerged as a separate forum for the administration of equity around the
fourteenth century. NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 22–23; see also 1 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL,
LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 206 (1878) (noting that the court began as a marble table
and chair at the upper end of Westminster Hall on the right hand side of the entryway,
opposite to the King’s Bench on the left). For details on the separation of law and equity
court systems, see Anenson, supra note 111, at 378 n.4. Countries of the civil law never
developed distinct concepts of law and equity. See Jerome Frank, Civil Law Influences on
the Common Law-Some Reflections on Comparative and Contrastive Law, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 887, 895 (1956) (comparing the English and German systems of equity).
118. See, e.g., Herbert Hevenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1641 (1988) (noting how directors, in contrast to shareholders,
are the entities allowed to assert constitutional claims involving the corporation).
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companies, 119 there are even more reasons to consider an equitable
response to unethical behavior. As business entities have grown in size and
sophistication, along with their insatiable interests and unethical
stratagems, so too has equity. 120 Indeed, it was the flexibility and
119. See generally SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., FIELD GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(2005) (placing Wal-Mart and General Motors in the top twenty-five overall in a 2002
comparison of countries’ national gross domestic products with the sales of major
corporations); SPECIAL REPORT: THE FORBES GLOBAL 2000 (2005), available at
http://www.forbes.com/2005/03/30/05f2000land.html (noting the influx of international
companies into non-domestic markets); WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007:
DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEXT GENERATION 294 (Table 4, Economic Activity), available at
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/09/13/000112742_
20060913111024/Rendered/PDF/359990WDR0complete.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2010)
(showing the economic activity of countries around the world); cf. DANIEL A. YERGIN &
JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY
(1998) (describing the imbalance of power between government and the growing private
sector to the point that nation-states have lost the ability to influence the market, to deliver
social goods, and to protect the environment); DAN BRIODY, THE HALLIBURTON AGENDA:
THE POLITICS OF OIL AND MONEY (2004) (commenting on the influence of private military
companies and their parents on foreign policy direction in some nation-states); RAYMOND
BAKER, CAPITALISM’S ACHILLES HEEL: DIRTY MONEY AND HOW TO RENEW THE FREE
MARKET SYSTEM (2005) (arguing that MNCs profit maximization objective has exploited
tax laws of different nation-states and deprived them of adequate pubic resources to regulate
the market or provide essential public goods); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL
CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS (2001) (discussing national governments’ deregulation
agendas leading to obscene profits and drastic income disparities due to the fear of capital
flight).
120. See Burbank, supra note 81, at 1296 (commenting that our legal culture is
accustomed to claims for the “‘triumph of equity’ and to thinking about equity as an engine
of legal development”); Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV. L.
REV. 171, 179-81 (1937) (predicting that the future of equity is good and certain because it
is a flexible tradition for allowing growth in the law). For the popularity of the doctrine of
“clean hands” in particular, see CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, supra note 34, at 12
(noting the “astonishing number” of cases decided under the doctrine of unclean hands);
Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 459 (“Despite its
containment to mainly actions in equity, cases considering the doctrine during the present
century already tally in the thousands.”).
Over the last decade, more than one-half of Americans owned stock in corporations,
in comparison with only one percent owning stock in 1900 and thirteen percent owning
stock in 1980. See THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL., THE FIRST MEASURED CENTURY: AN
ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO TRENDS IN AMERICA, 1900–2000 Ch. 14 (2001), available at
http://www.pbs.org/fmc/book/14business6.htm (discussing the amount of stock-holders
based on the percentage of the population); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006 455 (125th ed. 2005),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/income.pdf (providing 1998
data indicating that approximately fifty-two percent of Americans own stock in corporations
through individual investment, mutual funds, and pension plans). Large corporations also
employ tens of millions of workers. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra, at 382 (follow “Table
Number 655” link) (detailing the composition of individuals” savings). See generally
Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
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discretionary nature of equity that allowed courts to incorporate ethical
standards of business into the law in a way that reflected prevailing social
norms. 121
B.

Integration of Equity in Modern Contract Law

The success of the early equity courts and their principles should not
to be forgotten. 122 Today, many (if not most) of the theories of modern
contract law are derived from ancient equity. 123 Defenses like fraud,
duress, illegality, unconscionability, and accommodation originated in
equity. 124 Other equitable defenses like estoppel,125 waiver, 126 rescission, 127

Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 387, 390-92 (2003) (explaining
how the corporate structure provided an ideal legal framework for amassing the vast sums
necessary to develop capital and to facilitate business and financial objectives).
121. See NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 12-22; id. at 255 (“The evolution of law is to a
large extent the history of its absorption of equity.”); see also Mike Macnair, Equity and
Conscience, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659, 664 (2007) (noting the prevailing view of the
Chancery as providing a regime to deal with the defects of the late medieval common law,
which failed to adapt to new developments in society and the economy).
122. See, e.g., Keith Mason, Fusion: Fallacy, Future or Finished?, in EQUITY IN
COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 74 (commenting that “the Court of Chancery flowered
‘to soften and mollify the Extremity of the Law.’” (quoting Lord Ellesmere in his claim for
equity’s supremacy over Lord Coke’s common law before James I)); Douglas Laycock, The
Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 67-68 (1993) (explaining that common
law without equity would have been a functioning system, but in many applications it would
have been “barbarous, unjust, absurd” (quoting 1 FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 1, 19
(2d ed. 1936))).
123. See generally LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS: STANDARDS
AND PRINCIPLES 30 (2001) (explaining that the foundational principles of equity (fair play,
protection of weaker parties, equality of consideration) influenced the development of
contract law in the eighteenth century). It has also been argued that equitable principles
have been incorporated again into contract law during the twentieth century. See W. DAVID
SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE-20TH CENTURY EQUITABLE REFORMATION OF
CONTRACT LAW (1996) (asserting that beginning in the 1960s courts ended the remains of
unfettered freedom of contract and replaced it with the reasonable expectations approach
and fairness rationales in contract enforcement); See also Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s
Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of
Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265 (1999) (maintaining that equitable consideration of
fair exchange has increasingly been used as a counterweight to freedom of contract).
124. See James B. Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defenses, 9 HARV. L. REV.
49 (1896) (discussing how the former equitable defenses of fraud, illegality, failure of
consideration, payment, accommodation, and duress were subsequently recognized at law in
specialty contracts). For a discussion of the contribution of equity to the law of fraud, see 3
JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §§ 872-974a (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) and
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 907 (1985) (citing fraud as another
example of equitable affirmative relief to a legal claim). For unconscionability, see Leasing
Service Corp. v. Justice, 673 F.2d 70, 71 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Originating in Equity as a form of
relief against the harshness of penal bonds, [unconscionability] has been employed by courts
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ratification,128 and acquiescence 129 share a similar evolution. Unclean
hands also originated as a defense in contract cases. 130 But due to its
different procedural posture, it remained relegated to cases seeking
equitable relief for most of its two hundred year history. 131 Since the
to deny enforcement to harsh and unreasonable contract terms.”). Unconscionability has
also been made available at law or in equity as demonstrated by U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990) and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
125. See, e.g., Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68 (1880) (adopting equitable estoppel into the
common law); see also William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 485
(1938) (explaining that equitable estoppel was “fully adopted” in courts of law by 1938).
Equitable estoppel is comprised of three elements that courts must consider in accepting or
denying the use of the doctrine in a particular case. T. Leigh Anenson, From Theory to
Practice: Analyzing Equitable Estoppel Under a Pluralistic Model of Law, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 633, 640 (2007). There are also various kinds of estoppel defenses besides
equitable estoppel. For judicial estoppel, see Walter S. Beck, Estoppel Against Inconsistent
Position In Judicial Proceedings, 9 BROOK. L. REV. 245, 250-55 (1940). For collateral
estoppel, see Jay Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of
Issue Preclusion Make An Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court of
Law?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 84-88 (1986). For quasi-estoppel, see Simmons v.
Burlington, Cedar Raids & Northern Railway, 159 U.S. 278, 291 (1895).
126. See, e.g., USH Ventures v. Global Telesystems Group, Inc., 796 A.2d 7, 19 (Del.
Super. Ct. 2000) (“Waiver has been, for some time, used at law as a valid defense to
contract suits.”); cf. LAYCOCK, supra note 125, at 907 (“I have never been able to find out
whether waiver originated at law or equity, but it no longer matters.”).
127. 12A C.J.S. Cancellation of Instruments § 4 (1980); see also USH Ventures, 796
A.2d at 18 (noting that rescission is both a cause of action and a defense).
128. USH Ventures, 796 A.2d at 18-20; Colish v. Brandywine Raceway Ass’n, 119 A.2d
887, 892 (Del. Super. Ct. 1955). For a discussion on the ratification defense, see 1 JOHN N.
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA § 69 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941).
129. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 44 (Hornbook Series, 2d ed. 1993)
(discussing the invocation of acquiescence in purely legal cases).
130. Chafee I, supra note 34, at 878. The clean hands doctrine was first recognized as a
legal precedent in England in 1787. Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea, 1 Cox Eq. 318, 29 Eng.
Rep. 1185 (1787); see also Chafee I, supra note 34, at 881-82 (tracing the clean hands
doctrine’s origins in various treatises). The United States Supreme Court followed in 1795.
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795); see also Cathcart v. Robinson, 30 U.S. 264 (1831)
(recognizing that the defense was “well settled”); CHAFEE, supra note 34, at 5 (“[Unclean
hands] is exactly as old as the United States Constitution.”). The first state to recognize
unclean hands was New Jersey in 1793. Mason v. Evans, 1793 WL 453, at *4 (N.J. 1793).
But see Chafee I, supra note 34, at 884 (“The earliest judicial use of the phrase ‘clean
hands’ on this side of the Atlantic, as far as I know, was in Ohio in 1826.” (citing Mattox v.
Mattox, 2 Ohio 233, 233-34 (1826))). The idea of clean hands has been recognized for
nearly two thousand years in the civil law. NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 250 n.19
(explaining the clean hands doctrine’s application in Chinese customary law in the tenth and
eleventh centuries); Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29,
at 478 (noting the doctrine’s persistence in civil legal systems stemming from its use in
ancient Rome in the second century).
131. Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 465-66;
see also Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 29 (“Perhaps due to
its newness relative to the other doctrines, the defense remained exclusively a defense
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merger of law and equity courts and their procedures, 132 however, courts
have begun to fuse unclean hands into cases where legal relief, like
damages, is sought. 133

against equitable (not legal) actions at the time of the merger.”). When courts administered
law and equity in separate judicial systems before the merger, litigants pled unclean hands
exclusively as a defense to an action for equitable affirmative relief in the court of chancery.
DOBBS, supra note 130, §2.4(1) at 66-67; Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean
Hands, supra note 29. It was an equitable defense to equitable claims but not a defense to
legal claims. See Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies,
Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Unclean hands is a traditional defense to an action
for equitable relief.”); see also E.W. Hinton, Equitable Defenses under Modern Codes, 18
MICH. L. REV. 717, 719 (1920) (“[T]here were equitable defenses to equitable claims, where
there were no similar defense to corresponding legal claims.”); cf. John L. Garvey, Some
Aspects of the Merger of Law and Equity, 10 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 66-67 (1961) (noting that
laches shared the same procedural posture as unclean hands); Aalberts & Anenson, supra
note 81 (discussing the use of the equitable defense of laches).
For a discussion on the general operation of the two systems, see FREDERICK WILLIAM
MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 17 (Chayton ed. 1909); Willard Barbour,
Some Aspects of Fifteenth Century Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REV. 834, 834 (1918); William
Searle Holdsworth, The Relation of the Equity Administered by the Common Law Judges to
the Equity Administered by the Chancellor, 26 YALE L. REV. 1, 15 (1916).
132. While some early American courts were modeled upon the dual English system
with separate law and equity courts, WILLIAM F. WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 69-70 (1923), some state courts as well as the federal court
system administered law and equity in the same court with different procedures. Charles T.
McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Equity, 6 N.C. L. REV. 283, 284 (1928); Robert von
Moschzisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1927).
In the state court system, separate law and equity procedures began to be unified with
the 1848 Field Code in New York. Mildred Coe & Lewis Morse, Chronology of the
Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1942); Stephen N.
Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: An Historical Analysis of an Earlier
Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311 (1988); see also CHARLES E. CLARK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 19-20 (1928) (noting the Field Code’s influence
on the procedural reform in other states and territories). In the federal court system, the
unification occurred in 1938 when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect.
See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 929-39 (1987)
(discussing the historical use and development of equity in the federal court system); see
also NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 51 (explaining that the federal reform resulted in
“essentially the same reforms” as the states); cf. Lord Chancellor & Mr. Justice Lurton, The
Operation of the Reformed Equity Procedure in England, 26 HARV. L. REV. 99, 100-01
(1912) (discussing the simultaneous reform effort underway in England culminating in the
abolishment of the Court of Chancery and the enactment of the English Judicature Acts of
1873 and 1875); Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law
World, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435, 486-88 (2000) (discussing an 1828 speech by Lord
Brougham as the catalyst for procedural change). A handful of states, including Delaware,
have retained separate court systems and/or procedures. See Anenson, Post-Merger
Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 457 n.5 (listing states that have maintained
separate systems).
133. While the legal status of unclean hands remains an open question in most
jurisdictions, there are hundreds of cases now applying the defense against legal remedies.
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The issue of the fusion of law and equity has stimulated a world-wide
discussion. 134 In the United States, a series of articles has attempted to
clarify the conflict and confusion in the cases and justify the incorporation
of unclean hands into the law on doctrinal and normative grounds. 135 This
research explained that the law-equity merger in federal and state civil
procedure allows courts to adopt the defense in lawsuits seeking legal
remedies on a case-by-case basis. 136 The research further directs courts to
be sensitive to whether the application of the defense is consistent with its
purposes and does not otherwise defeat the purposes of the asserted
claim. 137 Therefore, the evolution of equity in general, and unclean hands
Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies, supra note 29 (detailing cases demonstrating the
application of the defense against legal remedies). The Supreme Court of Michigan and
lower courts in California, Maryland, New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island have begun
the process of adopting the equitable defense of unclean hands. Id. Federal courts from the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have also recognized the
doctrine’s availability under federal law in actions seeking legal relief. Id.; see also
Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29 (summarizing such
cases). But see Anenson, Process-based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 7 n.21
(noting five state supreme courts and lower courts that have rejected the defense of unclean
hands in damages actions).
134. See BEVERLEY MCLACHLIN, INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra
note 93, at vii (Chief Justice, Canadian Supreme Court) (“[D]espite the passage of time, the
fusion of law and equity remains a live issue today, subject to debate by academics,
practitioners, and judges alike.”); Tion Min Yeo, Choice of Law for Equity, in EQUITY IN
COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 147, 150 (“The extent of the fusion of the substantive
rules of common law and equity remains a matter of great controversy today, and different
legal systems in the common law tradition have adopted different approaches to this
question.”); see also MCLACHLIN, supra (calling the law-equity debate the “fusion wars”).
135. See, e.g., Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at
477-508 (arguing that the division of law and equity for the defense of unclean hands
answers the wrong question, lacks a rational basis, produces anomalous results, and invites
other irregularities in the administration of justice); accord Douglas Laycock, THE DEATH OF
THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991) (making this point persuasively in other aspects of
equity jurisprudence, like remedies); Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury
Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1990) (same); see also sources cited supra note 29; cf. Walter
Wheeler Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 YALE L.J. 645, 657 (1923) (reviewing case
confusion concerning the pleading of equitable defenses after merger, and concluding that
clear legal analysis is “absolutely essential if we are ever to blend common law and equity
law into a single, harmonious, and self-consistent system”).
136. See Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 47476; accord Anthony Mason, Fusion, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 12
(discussing merger in England and Australia, and noting: “it is also clear that the
[Judicature] Acts did not require the courts to treat the rules of common law and equity as if
they must forever remain unchanged in frozen isolation”); Mason, Fusion: Fallacy, Future
or Finished?, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 56 (“[I]t [is] equally clear
that the Judicature Act did not forbid the continuing development of law and equity,
including development in the direction of integration of principles, if the single Court
otherwise considered this an appropriate application of earlier precedents.”).
137. See, e.g., Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies, supra note 29 (“Rather than
continuing to deny the defense in legal actions in reliance on its historical pedigree, the
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in particular, provide a foundation for an equitable resolution to the issue of
excessive executive compensation.
V.

PUBLIC POLICY

Policy-based analysis supports the consideration of unclean hands
where a CEO’s excessive compensation is at issue. Specifically, fairness to
the parties and to the public outweigh freedom of contract concerns. The
emphasis on ethics and fair play in business relations, furthermore, is
equivalent to the definition of the defense.138 Modern ethics scholarship
imposes moral duties on both directors and the CEO and supports the
consideration of a CEO’s “clean hands.” Lastly, the use of the clean hands
defense is unlikely to raise pay and, even so, will cure compensation that is
excessively inflated in individual cases.
A.

Just Price and the Public Interest

As an initial matter, concerns for freedom of contract have always
been subject to equitable correction. 139 In medieval times, “just price”
trend of absorbing the equitable defense of unclean hands into the law is likely to continue
on the basis of policy.”). Zechariah Chafee, Jr., a practitioner and professor at Harvard Law
School, was the first scholar to thoroughly analyze unclean hands in the United States. The
Thomas M. Cooley Lectures that he delivered at the University of Michigan Law School in
1949 and his subsequent publications in the Michigan Law Review continue to be the
primary source of the American experience with the equitable defense. Chafee I, supra note
34; Chafee II, supra note 34; Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra
note 29. Chafee examined a total of eighteen different groups of cases considering unclean
hands and concluded that each case should be decided within the orbit of the transaction and
the surrounding facts. See Chafee I, supra note 34, at 887 (“[D]ecisions have been shaped
by the special requirements and the subjects and not merely ethics.”); id. at 892 (advising of
the great advantage of inducing a more critical exam of the various policies, ethical or
otherwise, which ought to govern the case).
138. See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-45 (1933)
(“[T]hat whenever a party who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and
obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in
his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; the court
will refuse to interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him any
remedy.”); CHAFEE, supra note 34, at 1 (declaring that the maxim of unclean hands “derives
from the unwillingness of a court of equity, as a court of conscience, to lend the aid of its
extraordinary powers to a plaintiff who himself is guilty of reprehensible conduct in the
controversy and thereby to endorse such behavior”); see, e.g., supra notes 33-36 and
accompanying text.
139. Judge Cardozo’s now classic opinion in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E.
889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) stated that “equity and fairness” outweighed “consistency and
certainty.” WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 166 (2002) (reviewing the
case); see also Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the
“Law of Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 443 (1995) (citing
the case as an example of the ongoing tug of war in contract law between the norms of
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theory moderated the certainty of contract relationships concerning
principles of fairness and morality. 140 The modern moral equivalent is the
doctrine of unconscionability where excessive price is one determinant of
the defense. 141 With employment agreements in particular, equitable
considerations have given rise to a social contract theory where courts look
to norms outside the four corners of the agreement.142
certainty and predictability and the norms of fairness and justice).
140. DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 3-28 (depicting how Thomas Aquinas resurrected the
Aristotelian theory of justice as a philosophical foundation for the medieval doctrine of just
price). A sale in excess of the just price was considered immoral and subject to judicial
scrutiny. Id. at 3. It was a multifaceted concept that acted as “a legal device, a moral
imperative, and an economic doctrine.” John W. Baldwin, The Medieval Theories of Just
Price: Romanists, Canonists, and Theologians in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, in
49 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 8 (1959); see also DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 11
(placing just price theory within the broader context of the ecclesiastical origins of equity
whose purpose was to protect those with a lower economic status and to enforce relations of
trust and confidence) (citations omitted).
141. See DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 13 (“Much of the Aristotelian logic embedded in
the notion of corrective justice that supported just price theory also underpins modern day
contract doctrine.”); id. at 5 (“[R]emnants of just price theory still reverberate in the
substantive fairness doctrines of the twentieth century.”). For cases discussing the origins of
unconscionability, see supra note 116 and accompanying text. Another contemporary
contract defense that looks to the equality of the bargain is economic duress. See
DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 13. Grave failures in the equivalence of value in the
exchange between the parties may also vitiate the basic assumption of the contract. See
ALCOA v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 91 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (applying concepts of
equivalence and basic assumption to the doctrines of impracticability, frustration of purpose,
and mistake); see also W.F. Young, Half Measures, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 19, 31 (1981)
(analyzing half measure remedies for mistakes to determine how courts cure false basic
assumptions about the contract); cf. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Rich, A Consent Theory of
Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 1067 (2006)
(arguing that despite the unconscionability doctrine’s grounding in substantive unfairness,
consent-based factors are more predictive of a court’s decision to use the doctrine).
142. See T. Leigh Anenson & Karen Eilers Lahey, The Crisis in Corporate America:
Private Pension Liability and Proposals for Reform, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 495 (2007)
(describing the companion concepts of relational contract and psychological contract
theory). Relational contract doctrine arose as a tool for understanding commercial contracts.
See, e.g., David Campbell, Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of Contract, in IAN
MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 3
(David Campbell ed., 2001) (describing historical development of relational contract
theory). Psychological contract theory began in the management literature as a method for
managing business relations. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV.
519, 549-53 (2001) (noting the expansion in application for psychological contract theory
from management employees to lower level employees, in addition to other areas of
employment law). Scholars have been pushing for recognition of these broader norms in all
areas of employment law. See Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 166 (2005) (explaining the history and development of
psychological contract theory and its growing popularity among employment law scholars);
cf. THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS
APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999) (allowing
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Recall too that contract law conceived the doctrine of unclean
hands. 143 Importantly, courts (including the U.S. Supreme Court) have
justified its application in business cases that are of great public interest.144
In the context of executive compensation, the use of unclean hands furthers
the broad public interest of reposing confidence in the pay process as well
as the judgment of the board.145 It also prevents the corresponding
consequences of such pay abuses to the company and its many
stakeholders. 146 Hence, it is private law that supports public policy.
B.

Ethics and Excessive Compensation

In addition, the foundation of the “clean hands” doctrine is ethical
behavior. 147 Since the astronomical rise in CEO paychecks and its
values, practices, policies to emerge locally, creating thick micro-social norms that have
community support as emanations of deliberative democracy on a local scale).
143. See discussion supra note 131 and accompanying text.
144. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (a court of
equity “may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted
contrary to the public interest”); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945) (invoking unclean hands in part due to the public interest);
accord Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273 (2d. Cir. 2005)
(extending equitable defense of laches to legal cases based on protection of third parties); cf.
Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrine, 27 HARV. L.
REV. 195, 226–27 (1914) (placing law in its historical context and comparing equity stage
that prevented the individualistic, unconscientious exercise of rights to early twentiethcentury socialization of law stage that prevented anti-social exercise of rights).
145. See Vagts, supra note 103, at 276 (“If the courts act, even occasionally, to trim
compensation it will, in turn, be easier for compensation committees to tell executives that
they simply cannot gratify their pocket-books and egos as much as the executives
demand.”); cf. SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that the
primary purpose of the disgorgement remedy against executives under the federal securities
laws is to “prevent wrongdoers from unjustly enriching themselves through violations,
which has the effect of deterring subsequent fraud . . . . The emphasis on public protection,
as opposed to simple compensatory relief, illustrates the equitable nature of the remedy”);
Schwartz, supra note 55, at 22-25 (discussing the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine
that imposes strict civil and criminal liability on CEOs whose companies violated statutes
dealing with public health, safety, and welfare, in situations where members of the public
cannot easily protect themselves).
146. See Martin, supra note 67, at 538 (noting that mere warnings from judges will not
“encourage directors to undertake serious, arms-length negotiations with CEOs and to reject
excessive packages”); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d
Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1105 (1971) (“[A] corporate
enterprise may well suffer harm when officers and directors abuse their position to obtain
personal profits since the effect may be to cast a cloud on the corporation’s name, injure
stockholder relations and undermine public regard for the corporation’s securities.”); see
also discussions in supra notes 5, 15.
147. See Chafee I, supra note 34, at 886 (reviewing cases where the defense was raised
in suits for specific performance of contracts where the applicant has engaged in fraud,
sharp practice, or other unethical conduct); see also supra notes 32-33 and accompanying
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repercussions, 148 scholars in applied philosophy and business have been
weighing in on the relationship between ethics and excessive
compensation. 149 All agree that executives and board members have ethical
duties to the company with respect to hiring and compensation.
A leading strain of criticism for excessive compensation is the
frequent disutility of CEO overcompensation, both to the corporation’s
long-term prospects and the short-term effects on shareholders. 150 Various
scholars of philosophy and management have emphasized that excessive
compensation packages detract from other functions of the corporation
(such as research and development), 151 from the morale of mid-level
managers, 152 and, most significantly, from shareholder earnings. 153
Moreover, regardless of utility, critics of extraordinarily large
compensation for CEOs believe that such compensation violates a basic
sense of fairness or justice, or what ethicists call distributive justice. 154
Furthermore, virtue ethics supports an ethical duty of the CEO and the
board not to negotiate, accept, and/or award unreasonable compensation.
In writing about executive compensation, virtue ethicists remind readers
that reducing human motives to strictly economic ones may very well miss
the heart of why people are called to a particular life in business. 155
text.
148. See discussion supra note 15.
149. See, e.g., Francis T Hannafey, Economic and Moral Criteria of Executive
Compensation, 108 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 405, 406 (2003) (proposing moral and economic
criteria in a preliminary effort to provide a framework for compensation decision-making);
see also supra notes 21-23.
150. See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 15; see also Nichols & Subramanian, supra note 113,
at 339 (noting that the utility of very large compensation packages is highly debatable).
151. Paul Wilhelm, Application of Distributive Justice Theory to the CEO Pay Problem:
Recommendations for Reform, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 469, 477 (1993).
152. Id.
153. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 283, 284 (Summer 2005); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 325-28 (1976) (concluding that perquisite consumption like automobiles, use of
corporate jets, and country club memberships is a diversion of company resources that
results in reduction of firm value); cf. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and The Theory of
the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 296 (1980) (taking the position that CEO use of company
perks are a cost to the company only if they are not offset by smaller paychecks).
154. Jared Harris, What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 147,
150 (2008).
155. See generally John Dobson, Ethics in Finance II, 53 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15, 16
(Jan/Feb 1997):
Thus, the “virtuous agent” is involved in a continual quest to find balance in
decision making. Such an agent does not apply any specific rules in making
decisions but rather attempts to make decisions that are consistent with the
pursuit of a particular kind of excellence that, in turn, entails exercising sound
moral judgment guided by such virtues as courage, wisdom, temperance,
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Business as a calling to “professionalism” calls forth far more humility and
public responsibility than we have seen in the recent culture of
extraordinary compensation. 156 All of these ethical perspectives are
consistent with the viewpoint, most recently expressed by Rakesh Khurana
at the Harvard Business School, that business leaders must be
“professionals” and move beyond a view that economic self-interest will
suffice for either self, corporation, or the social good.157
In light of the foregoing, ethicists espouse moral obligations of the
board to ensure that pay packages effectively align pay and performance
and are the result of a transparent, non-exclusive process. 158 In terms of the
process of hiring and compensation decisions, most commentators agree
that lack of independence (in its extreme forms, cronyism) is a breach of
the board’s fiduciary duties that can best be avoided with non-exclusivity

fairness, integrity, and consistency.
Id. at 16; see also MAX DEPREE, LEADERSHIP IS AN ART (1989). DePree has written one of
the best short books on ethics and leadership. When Max DePree was CEO of Herman
Miller, Inc., he wrote about leadership and ethics in this way:
Try to think about a leader, in the words of the gospel writer Luke, as “one
who serves.” Leadership is a concept of owing certain things to the institution.
It is a way of thinking about institutional heirs, a way of thinking about
stewardship as contrasted with ownership. Robert Greenleaf has written an
excellent book about this idea, Servant Leadership.
The art of leadership requires us to think about the leader-as-steward in terms
of relationships: of assets and legacy, of momentum and effectiveness, of
civility and values.
Dobson, supra, at 12.
156. The U.S. culture of compensation likely derives from the philosophical primacy of
finance and economics over an older set of aims (pre-World War II) in business education:
social responsibility and professionalism. Rakesh Khurana et al., Is Business Management a
Profession?, HARVARD BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE, Feb. 21, 2005,
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/4650.html. This could explain the premium that U.S. executives
receive in comparison with the rest of the world. See Wilhelm, supra note 152, at 469
(stating extraordinarily large compensation packages are more common in the United States
than in other industrialized democracies); see also supra notes 40-41 (showing U.S. CEO
compensation well above other countries).
157. Khurana et al., supra note 156; see also RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO
HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION (2007).
158. Harris, supra note 154, at 152. In business ethics parlance, these duties are
essentially a utilitarian demand that is part and parcel of executing the Board’s moral and
fiduciary duty of utmost care. While the ethics literature sometimes talks in terms of
“fiduciary duties,” this legal precept is also infused with ethical dimensions such as due
diligence, accountability, integrity, transparency, independence, and public responsibility.
Diligence, transparency, and independence are particularly important concerns for many
commentators with respect to a board’s responsibilities. See Perel, supra note 20, at 381;
see also discussion supra Part III.
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and transparency. 159 A number of studies attempt to recommend how
boards can best align pay and performance for the good of the company. 160
Others focus on how board members will only accomplish alignment by
being independent, using due diligence in crafting compensation packages,
and being transparent in how they go about hiring and compensating top
management. 161 Still others stress not only transparency, but also
accountability, integrity, and public responsibility. 162
Correspondingly, ethicists have recently focused on the executive
being hired. The literature expressly imposes a moral duty regarding
compensation. Professor Moriarty contends that the CEO has a fiduciary
duty to accept the minimum effective compensation–-the minimum amount
necessary to attract, retain, and motivate the CEO to maximize firm
value. 163 Likewise, Professor Bragues asserts that a virtuous executive, one
with strong character values, would not accept the highest possible amount
if it might conceivably harm others within the firm. 164 Professor Sayles
also reminds us that even a generous but fair compensation package meant
to align performance and pay can be manipulated by CEOs to achieve the
desired personal benefits.165 Thus, back-dating options, managing earnings
through the accounting process, and presenting a false face to the public is
extremely self-interested and hardly consistent with CEOs’ fiduciary and
ethical duties. 166
In short, not only directors but also CEOs have moral duties regarding
appropriate compensation. These ethical obligations arise both at the hiring
and initial compensation stage and thereafter. Where the executive has

159. Harris, supra note 154, at 152; Perel, supra note 20, at 381.
160. Walters et al., supra note 19, at 227. Exercising due diligence as part of their
fiduciary duties also requires sensitivity to the corporate culture; hiring a poor fit, or a good
fit at a rate of compensation that unnerves or disables esprit de corps within managerial
ranks can be a failure of fiduciary duty as well. Wilhelm, supra note 151, at 477.
161. Ella Mae Matsumura & Jae Yong Shin, Corporate Governance Reform and CEO
Compensation: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 101, 104 (Dec.
2005).
162. Avshalom M. Adam & Mark S. Schwartz, Corporate Governance, Ethics, and the
Backdating of Stock Options, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 225, 226 (2009).
163. Moriarty, supra note 15, at 235; see also supra note 163 (advising that what justice
requires as an ethical matter with respect to executive compensation will require a complete
theory of justice in wages).
164. George Bragues, The Ancients Against the Moderns: Focusing on the Character of
Corporate Leaders, 78 J. BUS. ETHICS 373, 380 (2008).
165. Leonard R. Sayles, The Tipping Point: How Good Executives Go Bad, 11 CORP.
FIN. REV. 18, 20-21 (2006).
166. Id.; see also Story & Dash, supra note 25 (“There are some real ethical questions
[concerning paying bonuses] given the bailouts and the precariousness of so many of these
financial institutions[.]” (quoting Jesse M. Brill, chairman of the California-based research
firm, CompensationStandards.com)). For specific examples of CEO misconduct, see infra
Part VI.B.
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accepted a position within the company that awards extraordinary
compensation or engages in questionable practices concerning her pay
package in a way that risks the company’s future for present personal gain,
she has engaged in unethical conduct that could well amount to unclean
hands. 167
C.

Sanctity of Contract and the Risk of Raising Pay

While promise-keeping, particularly honoring contractual obligations,
also has an ethical foundation, 168 a CEO’s ethical duties to the company
should outweigh the sanctity of contract in cases of excessive pay. This is
especially true where the executive knowingly compromises the long-term
viability of the firm or manages earnings to enhance personal profits rather
than focusing on the financial health of the company. 169 Certainly,
167. See Ertimur et al., supra note 42 (noting that executive pay has become a key
corporate governance theme due to the alleged role of high-powered incentives in the
corporate scandals of 2000-2002); see also Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating
Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON.
271, (2007) (discussing the option backdating scandal); David Yermack, Golden
Handshakes: Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs, 41 J. ACCT. ECON. 237, 240
(2006) (explaining large severance payments made to departing CEOs are a type payoff to
rid the company of the bad leadership); David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets,
CEO Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211, 230 (2006)
(stating that once corporate leaders get perquisites, corporate performance often falls).
168. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION (1982) (discussing the promise or moral-based nature of contracts); see also
DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 24 (noting the need to honor one’s contract was deemed a
solemn moral duty); id. at 5, 10 (providing examples of Christian and Jewish responses to
the failure to keep contractual promises (citing STEPHEN M. PASSAMANECH, THE
TRADITIONAL JEWISH LAW OF SALE 205 (1983) (explaining the formal condemnation before
the rabbinical court of someone who did not keep a contractual promise))); RICHARD H.
HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND 263, 287-88 (London: Hambledon
Press, 1987) (discussing how the failure to fulfill a contractual promise made under oath
posed the risk of excommunication).
169. Prime examples are the three bank executives who were called to testify before
Congress in March 2008 about their rich pay at the time that their firms were losing billions
in the housing and credit crisis they helped engineer. Elizabeth MacDonald, Final Thoughts
on the Fat Cat CEO Pay Hearing, FOXBUSINESS, Mar. 9, 2008,
http://emac.blogs.foxbusiness.com/2008/03/07/highlights-from-the-fat-cat-hearing-today
(discussing testimony of Angelo Mozilo, head of Countrywide Financial, the nation’s
biggest mortgage lender, E. Stanley O’Neal, former CEO of Merrill Lynch, and Charles
Prince, former CEO of Citigroup, who were collectively paid $460 million over five years
while their companies lost more than $20 billion in last two quarters of 2007). O’Neal was
allowed to retire and received $161.5 million in exit pay when Merrill Lynch reported $18
billion in write-downs related to risky mortgages and its stock price had fallen to nearly half
its value. Id. Prince was allowed to resign and received roughly $30 million, including a
cash bonus of more than $10 million, millions of dollars in unvested restricted stock and
stock options, and perquisites worth $1.5 million annually. Id. Prince even got a
performance bonus in 2007 when Citigroup (like Merrill Lynch) took more than $18 billion
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allowing companies to escape contract liability raises the possibility that it
may deter executives from serving at the helm. 170 But studies from the
business academies and elsewhere suggest that companies may not want
those kinds of leaders in the first place. 171 Excessive pay packages
continue to be justified as the “free market” finding of the competitive
price of top managerial talent. However, many observers point out that the
market is somewhat skewed by a number of factors.172 Directors are also
often mistaken in their estimation of the efficacy of incentivizing CEOs and
other top management. 173
Additionally, along with narrowing the pool of potential executives,
there is the possibility that the availability of unclean hands could result in
higher CEO pay. Financial economists might claim that by decreasing pay
predictability, the CEO would seek a risk premium to compensate for it.
Even assuming an executive could accomplish that aim, the idea of
acoustic separation suggests that the application of unclean hands in an
in write-downs related to the subprime and credit crisis and its stock dropped by almost half.
Id. For a discussion of Mozilo, see infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
170. Edward M. Liddy, the government-appointed chairman of AIG (now 80%
government-owned), attempted to justify the multi-million dollar bonuses to company
executives and managers in the unit that caused the financial collapse of the company and
the broader U.S. economy as necessary to keep the most skilled executives, and argued they
should not be subject to arbitrary adjustment by the U.S. Treasury. Andrews & Baker,
supra note 24.
171. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 785 (2002) (“It is important to
emphasize that the cost to the shareholders resulting from the extraction of rents [by the
CEO] might well be higher than the amount of the rents themselves. To the extent that rent
extraction involves efficiency costs—due, in particular, to the adoption of inefficient
compensation arrangements—the shareholders’ losses will be larger than the rents extracted
by managers.”); see also Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 54 (noting the
plethora of evidence on CEOs responding predictably to dysfunctional compensation
arrangements). Scholars studying executive compensation agreements agree that optimal
contracting concerns do not explain the level and structure of CEO pay, but differ on the
reasons for it. Compare Bebchuk et al., supra (relying on features of stock option plans to
argue that managerial power and captured boards design pay plans to transfer rents to CEOs
in ways that mitigate public outrage) with Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15
(relying on the same evidence for the alternative hypothesis that companies and their
managers erroneously perceive the cost of granting options to be far below their economic
cost).
172. See generally Wilhelm, supra note 151, at 469. For example, executive searches
are often “exclusive” and do not include women and minorities, compensation consultants
have a strong upward influence on the range of compensation, tax advantages are factored
into the packages (thus making use of public resources rather than strictly free market
mechanisms), and the process is not always open and competitive. Id. Board members,
even though they do have fiduciary duties, are essentially using “other people’s money,”
which invariably raises the “market” price. Id.
173. See Harris, supra note 154, at 147 (discussing the structuring of managerial
incentives); see also Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15 at 59 (discussing
incentivizing in the context of the relationship between compensation and performance).
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effort to reduce excessive compensation would not yield a contradictory
outcome.
A condition of “acoustic separation” 174 assumes that a rule of
conduct—like contracts are binding as embodied in the common law
concept of pancta sunt servanda—and a standard of decision—like the
equitable doctrine of “clean hands”—can operate in tandem and fulfill the
policy functions of both precepts. 175 The dual system, however, is
dependent on the public being at least partially unaware that the rigid rule
is actually more lenient in application.176 This hidden exception to rulebased decision-making provides selective transmission.177 As a result,
there is a partial separation between the rule of conduct and the rule of
decision such that the law can successfully pursue both ends.178
Scholars have studied the theory of acoustic separation in equity and
agree that equitable defenses operate under partial acoustic separation.179
Professor Emily Sherwin advanced the concept of acoustic separation in
justifying equitable defenses in contract law.180 She concluded that public
174. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (using “acoustic separation” to
describe a situation where the general public and the rule-making officials are separated into
acoustically sealed chambers).
175. Id. at 630-34 (distinguishing conduct rules and decision rules of acoustic
separation).
176. Id. (discussing the conflict between the normative message of acoustic separation
and the actuality of its implementation). Partial acoustic separation can occur any time
certain normative messages are more likely to be understood by officials than by the public.
Id. at 633-34 (elaborating on normative messages).
177. Id. at 635 (explaining how the law attempts to segregate messages to the public
from messages to officials).
178. Professor Sherwin explains the benefits of acoustic separation:
Acoustic separation suggests a way for the authority to escape this dilemma, by
deceiving citizens about the force of the rule in official decisions. In other
words, the authority might hold out to private parties a determinate rule, with
implicit or explicit instructions that the rule will be enforced by courts. At the
same time, it might provide courts with a less determinate standard that calls for
direct application of the underlying norm to particular cases. If this standard can
be obscured from public view, it will not affect the weight of the rule in the
citizens' calculations. The authority can capture the value of rules at the level of
public conduct, but leave judicial decisions open to a broader range of
justifications.
Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REV. 253, 306
(1991).
179. Id. at 306 (“Remedies are remote from lay understandings of law. Equitable
remedies, and the various secondary limitations on damages that make specific performance
important, are remoter still.”); Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of
Limitations and the Doctrine of Laches, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 949 (“In general, the
common law is considerably more familiar to both lay persons and their attorneys than is
equity.”).
180. Sherwin, supra note 178, at 307 (“The legal model of enforcement is conduct-
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ignorance of the equitable defense of fairness allowed courts to use it to
achieve fairness and justice without sacrificing the pursuit of stability in
contract law. 181 Simply put, “[t]he legal model of enforcement tells the
public that contracts will be enforced, while the equitable model gives
relief from hardship in particular cases.” 182
If these assumptions are correct, the obscurity of the equitable doctrine
of “clean hands” similarly permits fairness-based adjudication without
sacrificing conduct values. In the context of CEO compensation, the
implication of acoustic separation means that executives will have only
limited cognizance of the defense and, consequently, will fail to negotiate
in anticipation of it. 183 However, while the obscurity of equitable defenses
may be accurate in other contexts, the existing economic upheaval has
pushed CEO compensation to the forefront of public consciousness. 184 As
such, court action in curtailing excessive executive compensation with the
doctrine of “clean hands” would likely not go unnoticed. Yet the
heightened public and political scrutiny (as well as forthcoming reforms) of
bold executives who have used the name of business to “gild their crimes”
would also make it more difficult for CEOs to negotiate higher
compensation. 185 If they do succeed, and their employment agreement

oriented and rule-based. The equitable model is better suited to remedial goals and
particularistic [sic] decisionmaking.”).
181. Id. at 308 (maintaining that the lack of public awareness of the equitable fairness
defense is because the public does not know remedies and because lawyers will not research
remedies after the breach or at the transaction stage). Professor Gail Heriot makes a similar
argument with respect to the equitable defense of laches. Heriot, supra note 179, at 949-51;
see also Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note 29, at 463
(noting laches and unclean hands share a similar procedural posture).
182. Sherwin, supra note 178, at 308.
183. The extension of unclean hands to legal actions indicates that litigants and their
attorneys will become aware of it. See Ralph A. Newman, The Place and Function of Pure
Equity in the Structure of Law, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 401, 426-27 (1965) (discussing the effects
of available defenses on remedies granted); Andrew J. Wistrich, Procrastination, Deadlines,
and Statutes of Limitation, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 607, 656 (2008) (explaining that
damages are the “most common and desired remedy”). Nevertheless, while executives may
become aware of the defense, they still will not know when and if it will apply due to the
uncertainty of its application under the circumstances. See Sherwin, supra note 178, at 302
n.222 (noting parallel in Bentham’s design (as interpreted by Postema) to Dan-Cohen’s
model of acoustic separation in that the rules of law would not be determinative in
adjudication, which would have no precedential value, and therefore would not alter the
conduct rules (citing GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 40308 (1986))). This is probably why law and equity have been seen as the perfect rulestandard pair for centuries. Infra note 193. The board of directors, however, should be
aware of the defense in order to encourage them to withhold payment under appropriate
circumstances and risk a breach of contract action.
184. See supra notes 14, 17-18 and accompanying text.
185. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS (FIRST AND SECOND SERIES) 44 (1990) (SelfReliance).
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permits exorbitant pay under the circumstances, unclean hands would be
available to ensure that they do not receive or keep the excessive amount.
In any event, the goal of the defense is not to decrease pay overall or
even to best align pay with performance. Rather, the purpose of unclean
hands is to provide justice in individual cases. 186 In the context of CEO
pay, application of the defense means that business leaders who are morally
and legally accountable to shareholders will not get away with excessivelylined pockets caused by their own ethical lapses and reckless choices.187
To the extent that executives have dirtied their otherwise “clean hands,”
courts will not allow them to profit from their actions and thereby preserve
the integrity of the judicial system in the process.188
VI. USING “CLEAN HANDS” IN CEO COMPENSATION CASES
Finally, notwithstanding recent scholarship to the contrary, the judicial
system can and should discern overcompensation through the doctrine of
“clean hands.” 189 As a practical matter, courts are competent to measure
186. Clawbacks and nonbinding shareholder “say on pay” votes operate in a similarly
discreet fashion. Supra Part II.A. & B; see also infra Part VI.B. (outlining circumstances
for a court to consider in applying unclean hands). The doctrine of “clean hands” protects
the parties and the court. E.g., Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873, 881 (3d Cir. 1959);
Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co., 719 N.W.2d 809, 818 (Mich. 2006); Kendall-Jackson
Winery Ltd. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr.2d 743, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
187. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 815 (1945) (explaining that the doctrine prevents “a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits
of his [or her] transgression”); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240,
245 (1933) (emphasizing that a complainant can only have standing if he comes into court
with clean hands); Fairway Developers, Inc. v. Marcum, 832 N.E.2d 581, 585 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005) (“The purpose of the unclean hands doctrine is to prevent a party from reaping
benefits from his misconduct.”); Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd. v. Superior Court, 90
Cal.Rptr.2d 743, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (opining that unclean hands doctrine makes the
wrongdoer litigant “answer for his [or her] own misconduct in the action”).
188. See, e.g., Chafee II, supra note 34, at 1091 (concluding that unclean hands is not
peculiar to equity given that it considers the plaintiff’s fault but is “a general principle
running through damage actions as well as suits for specific relief”). The Supreme Court
explained the rationale of unclean hands: “Th[e] doctrine is rooted in the historical concept
of court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience
and good faith. This presupposes a refusal on its part to be the abettor of iniquity.”
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945)
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
189. See Markham, supra note 60 (reviewing fiduciary duty law and questioning the
competence of courts to establish a metric of excessive executive compensation). While we
agree with Professor Markham that existing laws have not yet solved the problem of
executive compensation, we disagree with his underlying thesis (as we understand it) that
because law has not yet cured the excessive executive pay problem, we should quit trying to
use it. Id. (arguing that it should be left to the market to control executive pay excesses).
The power and prestige of the ancient chancellors did not derive from the fact that they were
able to definitively resolve the perennial problems of life through law, but rather because
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excessive pay that amounts to unclean hands in order to check CEO
compensation. They have used a similar metric of unreasonableness of pay
in other corporate contexts. Assessing when “excessive” equals “unclean”
can also be made by reference to quantitative and qualitative determinants
used in the growing accounting, finance, economics, and management
literature on the subject. Ethical considerations and prevailing public
morality should also play a role. 190
A.

Institutional Competence

With any discretionary decision, there is a risk of arbitrariness and
error in the adjudication process. 191 The possibility of uncertain and
inconsistent outcomes is not unique to equity or unclean hands,192 but
they understood and became a part of the mystery. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate,
58 TEXAS L. REV. 695, 775 n.323 (1980) (discussing the challenges of legal interpretation
and the goal of achieving justice: “Like the grub that builds its chamber for the winged
thing it has never seen but is to be . . . .” (quoting a speech by Oliver Wendell Holmes
reprinted in LAW AND THE COURT, THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES 168, 174 (M. Howe ed. 1962))). The inexhaustible circumstances of life are a
constant stimulus for creativity and reform. Equity is particularly well-suited to be an
engine of change. Anenson, supra note 111; accord DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 7.
190. See discussion supra Part V.B.
191. See, e.g., Steve Hedley, Rival Taxonomies Within Obligations: Is There a
Problem?, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 77, 87 (advocating the
continued use of equity but noting that there will be legitimate concerns over the degree of
flexibility that should be allowed (citing articles on debate about “discretionary
remedialism”)); Smith, supra note 93, at 38 (noting that uncertainty and inconsistency are
two different vices of discretion); Honorable Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About
Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982) (discussing the importance of “broad judicial
review” in preserving various principles of jurisprudence); Doug Rendleman, The Trial
Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following Ebay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 64
(2007) (citing articles devoted to discretion in substance, procedure, and jurisprudence); see
also NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 19-20 (citing “equality” as one of the necessary virtues of
justice (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, JURISPRUDENCE 37 (5th ed. 1923))); Main, supra note
113, at 444 (“[T]here is no more fundamental social interest than that law should be uniform
and impartial.”).
192. Chafee II, supra note 34, at 1079 (listing examples of unclean hands decisions
where the judicial preoccupation with morality led to an increase in immorality); see also
Harold Greville Hanbury, The Field of Modern Equity, in ESSAYS IN EQUITY 32 (1934)
(describing the “golden age” of equity as beginning during the time of Lord Nottingham
who began the transformation of equity “from a heterogeneous medley of isolated, empirical
beliefs into a stable and increasingly rigid system of rules” until the first years of the
nineteenth century); JOHN SELDON, TABLE TALK 49 (Books for Libraries Press, 1927) (1855)
(quoting Seldon’s famous words that equity varied with the length of the chancellor’s foot);
Patrick S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial
Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251-59 (1980) (describing how English
equity and the common law lost flexibility in the nineteenth century followed by a
resurgence of discretion after the merger of law and equity in the twentieth century).
Readers may also remember that it was Charles Dickens, in BLEAK HOUSE, who portrayed
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pervades all aspects of laws that are measured by standards rather than
rules. 193 Nonetheless, a benefit of discretion is the courts’ ability to capture
the wide range of misbehaviors associated with the defense. 194 What is
“unclean,” like what is fraud, necessitates some ambiguity to promote
deterrence. 195
It is not hope alone, but the wisdom of the ages that supports equitable
intervention into executive employment contracts.196 Too often, in our
industrial and now information age, we attempt to create theories that
objectify law in order to solve moral and political problems in the way that
businesses use technology to solve physical problems. 197 Supreme Court
jurisprudence shows that legal interpretation has not been immune from
this cultural influence. But law (especially equity), like ethics, is a form of

the arrogance and delay of the English chancery courts through the metaphor of the fog that
never lifts. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 14 (Nicola Bradbury ed., Penguin
Classics 2003) (1853) (“Never can there come fog too thick . . . which this High Court of
Chancery, most pestilent of hoary sinners, holds, this day . . . .”).
193. The rules-standards debate has been a popular academic discussion. The key
question is how much uncertainty is tolerable in the area of law that the defense is applied.
See MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2000) (“No sensible
person supposes that rules are always superior to standards, or vice versa . . . .”).
194. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
815 (1945) (“[Unclean hands] necessarily gives wide range to the equity court’s use of
discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant.”); MEGARRY & BAKER, supra note 111, at
105-06 (discussing how details of a trust in a property law case may not necessarily be
produced in writing but rather through extrinsic evidence); NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 28
(“Relief in the court of the Chancellor was granted according to criteria which were not
confined by rules of strict logic or by analogy to prior decisions.”); see also Smith, supra
note 93, at 38 (discussing the relationship between equity and law and noting that discretion
is not necessarily an injustice); Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The
Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 380 (1975)
(discussing the obvious inappropriateness of denying discretion when a decision-maker
must choose among an almost infinite number of alternatives on bases that are complex and
yield uncertain conclusions); Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Judge,
Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 662 (1971) (“Many questions that arise in
litigation are not amenable to regulation by rule because they involve multifarious, fleeting,
special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization . . . .”). For the historical origin and
evolution of equitable discretion generally, see Anenson, supra note 111, at 384-87.
195. See discussion supra note 79 and accompanying text.
196. The “power of discretion” has been considered the “great contribution of equity” to
the administration of justice. HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
EQUITY 2 (West Pub. Co. 1948) (1936).
197. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 185 (1991) (emphasizing the
necessity of moral decision in adjudication); cf. Arnie Cooper, Computing the Cost, 399 THE
SUN 4, 11 (Mar. 2009) (noting a conversation with Nicholas Carr, which discusses
technology and the fear that “a definition of intelligence that discredits the individual mind
in favor of some automated collective mind will feed powerful systems: governments,
corporations, and other large institutions. And it will emphasize efficiency of thought over
depth of thought”).
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practical wisdom. 198 It is perception, not simply precepts. It is not only
about learning rules, but also about mastering bodies of practice.199 It is
Cardozo’s intuition and Llewellyn’s “situation sense.” 200 In fact, it is the
very humanness of adjudication that gives our legal system the chance of
justice. 201
Besides, legal theorists tell us that the experiential process of
precedent moves legal precepts from the abstract to the particular and
placed. 202 Doctrinal analysis over time produces clearly discernable
decisional patterns. 203 Prior articles have traced the pattern of equitable

198. E.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) (discussing natural
law theory and practical wisdom); cf. V.N. Awasthi, Managerial Decision-Making on
Moral Issues and the Effects of Teaching Ethics, 78 J. BUS. ETHICS 207 (2008) (finding
ethics courses influence management judgment).
199. E.g., HUHN, supra note 139, at 13; Anenson, supra note 125, at 638.
200. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19, 25 (1922)
(mentioning that decisions must be felt or that judges must feel their way); KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960) (describing the common law process of
creating law through the groupings of transaction-types or situation-sense).
201. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 197, at 147, 168-69
(explaining that justice is created out of the process of deciding because there is no metarule or hierarchy among the incommensurable modalities of legal interpretation); id. at 177
(“The space for moral reflection on our ideologies is created by the conflict among
modalities, just as garden walls create space for a garden.”). Resort to the heritage of equity
also has a normative quality all its own. Reliance on ancient equitable tradition
demonstrates that institutions are as faithful as they are fair. Smith, supra note 93, at 19, 30;
see also Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 189, at 765 (commenting that use of
historical argument acknowledges the limits of our wisdom and the modesty of our
perspective).
202. Professor Wilson Huhn’s insight was that standards evolve into rules through the
use of formalistic analogies that identify the factual similarities in the cases that apply the
standard. Wilson R. Huhn, The Stages Of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy and
Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 378-79 (2003). Rules evolve into standards through the use
of realistic analogies that identify the interests justifying exceptions to the rule. Id. at 307
(proposing that precedent bridges the transition between formalism and realism and vice
versa); see also Anenson, supra note 125, at 643-51 (illustrating the phenomena in cases
considering the equitable defense of estoppel). See generally NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE
AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT (2008) (providing a historical and philosophical analysis of
how precedent operates in the common-law system).
203. See Huhn, The Stages Of Legal Reasoning, supra note 202, at 308-10 (labeling
three discrete forms of legalisms as formalism, analogy and realism); cf. Amy Coney
Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1072 (Summer 2003)
(“Allowing an issue to be hashed out multiple times compensates for the imperfections—the
very humanness—in the process of decisionmaking. It allows the courts to see a more
complete picture before rushing to judgment.”). See generally Emily Sherwin, A Defense of
Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (1999) (explaining the benefits of
judge-made law as providing numerous data for decision-making, representing the
collaborative efforts of judges over time, correcting the biases that might lead judges to
discount the force of precedent, and exerting a conservative force in the law to change at a
gradual pace).
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integration of unclean hands in legal cases.204
Courts have also evaluated the reasonableness of corporate decisions
concerning executive compensation in tax cases to determine the
deductibility of pay in close corporations. 205 Excessiveness is also subject
to a merit-based review of reasonableness in situations of corporate
takeovers. 206 Likewise, legal scholars have suggested similar standards of
“reasonableness” in testing excessive executive pay packages in the
fiduciary duty context. 207 Additionally, checking compensation levels for
reasonableness at different times during the contractual relationship is not
anathema to contract law. Liquidated damages, for instance, require that
stipulated damages be reasonable at the time of contracting and at the time
of breach. 208 Executive compensation can be similarly seen from two
perspectives of reasonableness: anticipated reasonableness—time of
entering the contract—and actual reasonableness—time of the payment of
bonuses or stock options or at severance. Thus, courts could consider a
CEO’s conduct ex-ante to contract formation as well as ex-post, such as
when the executive has engaged in reckless risk-taking. The sheer size of
the pay package alone may also be grounds for the dismissal.

204. See generally Anenson, Post-Merger Justification of Unclean Hands, supra note
29. Cf. Anenson, supra note 125 (discussing equitable estoppel).
205. See Martin, supra note 67, at 538 (citing cases). In Elliotts, Inc. v. C.I.R., the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals articulated a five-factor inquiry for the reasonableness of
compensation: (1) the employee’s role in the company; (2) a comparison of the employee’s
salary with those paid by similar companies for similar services; (3) the character and
condition of the company; (4) potential conflicts of interest; and (5) evidence of an internal
inconsistency in a company’s treatment of payments to employees. 716 F.2d 1241, 1245-47
(9th Cir. 1983). The court additionally advised that when conducting the reasonableness
inquiry, “it is helpful to consider the matter from the perspective of a hypothetical
independent investor. A relevant inquiry is whether an inactive, independent investor would
be willing to compensate the employee as he was compensated.” Id. at 1245.
206. See Martin, supra note 67, at 538 (citing cases).
207. See, e.g., Barris, supra note 103, at 59 (arguing for testing of the reasonableness of
compensation by comparing compensation levels with those of similar firms); Vagts, supra
note 103, at 252-61 (same); Yablon, supra note 103, at 1897-99 (reviewing GRAEF
CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES
(1991) (arguing for an intermediate level of scrutiny in reviewing compensation packages));
see also Thomas & Martin, supra note 95, at 599-605 (discussing the arguments on both
sides).
208. Larry A. DiMatteo & T. Leigh Anenson, Teaching Law and Theory Through
Context: Contract Clauses in Legal Studies Education, 24 J. LEG. STUD. EDUC. 19, 41-42
(2007); see also Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633 (2001) (critiquing the law of liquidated damages
and suggesting that the separate rules for reviewing the liquidated damages clause be
eliminated in favor of the doctrine of unconscionability).
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Measuring Excessive Pay

Along with existing ethical principles and common law considerations
of reasonableness, a workable framework for determining when excessive
is unclean can be derived from business practice. There is much to be
learned from business scholars who have been testing the causes and
implications of excessive executive pay. By way of background, CEO
contracts are typically for a period of five years and specify a base salary,
annual bonus payments, stock options, and long-term incentive plans.209
A starting point of determining unclean conduct in seeking contracted
for compensation that is excessive under the circumstances could be an
economic one. 210 Excessive could be measured as pay relative to the
market, industry, or firm performance. 211 Since there is widespread use of
the controversial practice of competitive benchmarking, 212 the amount and
209. Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 3, 5. While base salary
comprises a declining percentage of overall compensation, see Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B.
Leibman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653 (1998) (noting that
stock options became the largest component of executive pay for all industries except
utilities in the 1990s), it is still important given that most parts of the compensation package,
such as target bonuses and option grants, are measured relative to the base salary level.
Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 10 (noting that each dollar increase in
base salary has positive impact on the other compensation components). Defined pension
benefits and severance arrangements also depend on salary levels. Id.
210. See, e.g., Ertimur et al., supra note 42, at 17 (providing economic measure of
excessive); id. at 23 (explaining that the increase in compensation related shareholder
proposals may be because investors have easier access to measures of excessive or abusive
CEO pay in the post-Enron period through governance rating agencies (e.g., The Corporate
Library)).
211. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 85. For instance, contracts typically award CEOs
large blocks of stock options to align their interests with company shareholders. Randall S.
Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option
Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 37-38 (2000). However, contract terms usually do not
restrict executives from engaging in derivative transactions with their options based on
factors other than firm performance. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An
Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 264 (2006) (explaining that out of a data set of 271 executive
contracts with stock option compensation, only five restricted their sale, only three restricted
or prohibited hedging, and none restricted or prohibited pledging); cf. David M. Schizer,
Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundations of Incentive Compatibility, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 440, 460 (2000) (claiming that stock option restrictions and insider trading
policies constrain executive hedging or pledging of stock options).
212. Scholars claim that benchmarking in the form of industry median compensation
statistics raises pay independent of CEO or firm performance. See, e.g., Paul Oyer, Why Do
Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?, 59 J. FIN. 1619 (2004). An
alternative view is that benchmarking represents an efficient way to determine the
reservation wage of the CEO. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of US
Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 19
(2003) (“The main problem with executive pay levels is not the overall level, but the
extreme skew in the awards . . . . To deal with this problem, we need more effective
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kind of pay package relative to industry peer groups should be analyzed
while scrutinizing how the proposed peer group was constituted.213
The quantitative metric would be assessed along with other qualitative
indicators. 214 Such factors may include the managerial skill requirements,
job complexity, and span of control. 215 Additional criteria for earnings
levels would include age, experience, education, and performance.216 The
need for retention in a tight labor market and any other indicia of CEO
quality or job skills other than firm performance could also be
considered. 217
In addition to a substantive review, the decision-making process of

benchmarking[,] not less of it.”).
213. Use of competitive benchmarking based on industry salary surveys is nearly
universal in CEO contracts. See John M. Bizjak et al., Does the Use of Peer Groups
Contribute to Higher Pay and Less Efficient Compensation?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 152, 153
(2008) (finding 96 of 100 randomly selected firms from the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index in
1997 used competitive benchmarking); Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at
9. The practice has generated considerable controversy. Some fear that setting pay by peer
groups would institutionalize those components of pay that are not directly linked to
performance measures. Bizjak et al., supra, at 213. CEOs themselves and directors have
expressed concerns about its “ratchet” effect on salaries irrespective of performance and the
predilections of the board to place its CEO in the top half of the peer group so the company
looks strong. Id. (quoting Walter Wriston, former chairman and CEO of Citicorp, and
member of the compensation committee at General Electric Co. in the Wall Street Journal
in 1991 and Edgar Woolard Jr., former CEO of Dupont and director at IBM, Apple, and
Citigroup in the Harvard Business Review in 2003); see also Brian Hall, Six Challenges to
Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 21 (2003) (noting rise in pay per
salary surveys is consistent with the views of executives and salary consultants themselves).
214. See W. VON LEYDEN, ARISTOTLE ON EQUALITY AND JUSTICE 12 (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1985) (explaining that Aristotle’s concept of just price was subjective, while
Thomas Aquinas objectified the economic exchange); DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 17
(noting that “there was not one, but many conceptions of just price” in early contract law).
215. See Murphy, Executive Compensation, supra note 15, at 9 (discussing metrics used
to determine CEO base salaries).
216. Id.; see also Kevin J. Murphy, Incentives, Learning and Compensation: A
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts, 17 RAND J. ECON.
59 (1986) (arguing that boards learn about CEOs over time and reward those with great
ability).
217. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been,
How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them, 34 (European
Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 44, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=561305 (noting that “the managerial
labor market has become relatively more important for top executives in the US”). For
instance, labor market considerations play a significant role in firms’ decisions to re-price
employee stock options. Mary Ellen Carter & Luann J. Lynch, An Examination of
Executive Stock Option Repricing, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2001); N.K. Chidambaran &
Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala, Executive Stock Option Repricing, Internal Governance
Mechanisms, and Management Turnover, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 153 (2003); see also Bizjak et al.,
supra note 213, at 164 (concluding that benchmarking pay with peer groups to gauge the
market wage is an efficient way to determine pay for retention purposes).
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setting compensation levels should be evaluated in light of the so-called
“crony capitalism” that can constitute corporate management. 218 Courts are
certainly aware of the possibility of management capture as well as
industry best practices like the use of compensation consultants relative to
Additional considerations in evaluating
pay setting procedures. 219
executive pay decisions may include board leadership style, ethical values,
strategies, as well as conflict management. 220 Corresponding motives of
the CEO could also be considered. 221 In conjunction with fiduciary duty
law, 222 unclean hands may at least be better than after-the-fact emergency
legislation to “inspire a true sense of ethical obligation.” 223
218. LAUFER, supra note 8, at 196-97. See, e.g., Garvey & Milbourn, supra note 28
(finding that CEOs are paid more for good luck than they are punished for bad luck that is
indicative of the CEO’s ability to act opportunistically in setting pay). For a discussion of
the negotiation and contract terms for Countrywide CEO, Angelo Mozilo, see infra notes
231-35.
219. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 55-58 (Del. 2006) (listing
procedures such as use of compensation expert); cf. Martin, supra note 67, at 519 (noting
compliance may obviate shareholder litigation but not prevent excessive compensation
packages since best practices contemplate procedural safeguards, not substantive ones);
accord Brian Cadman et al., The Role and Effect of Compensation Consultants on CEO Pay
(2007) (Wharton School Working Paper, on file with authors) (suggesting that executive
pay schemes reflect more efficient contracting when consultants are involved in the
compensation process).
The use of compensation consultants in designing executive pay packages has risen
over the past few years. Id. (citing Alexandra Higgins, The Effect of Compensation
Consultants: A Study of Market Share and Compensation Policy Advice, THE CORPORATE
LIBRARY (2007)) (concluding that stronger governance rules have caused boards to rely on
the advice of independent consultants); Francesco Guerrera, US companies warned about
pay advisers, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2006, at 13. Critics allege that consultants help disguise
and justify excessive executive pay that helps executives extract wealth from the firm at the
shareholders’ expense. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance:
Overview of the Issues, 20 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 5 (2006); Graef S. Crystal, Why
CEO Compensation Is So High, 34 CALIF. MGT. REV. 9 (Fall 1991); Gretchen Morgenson,
Gilded Paychecks: Troubling Conflicts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006.
220. See Jeffrey Sonnenfield, Good Governance and the Misleading Myths of Bad
Metrics, 18 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 108, 112 (2004) (“At least as important are the human
dynamics of boards as social systems where leadership character, individual values,
decision-making processes, conflict management, and strategic thinking will truly
differentiate a firm’s governance.”).
221. Moriarty, supra note 15 (defining the ethical duty of the CEO regarding her
compensation subjectively); see also DIMATTEO, supra note 123, at 14 (noting controversy
in the calculation of just price: “Is it the market price, that being the price that the market
will bear? Or is it the amount the particular purchaser is willing to pay?”). Evaluating
motive and conduct under all the circumstances is also the mainstay of the interference tort.
See T. Leigh Anenson, Creating Conflicts of Interest: Litigation as Interference with the
Attorney-Client Relationship, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 173 (2006) (analyzing the tort of
interference).
222. As discussed supra Part III, the usefulness of the “clean hands” doctrine depends in
part on board’s willingness to withhold pay under appropriate circumstances.
223. William H. Donaldson, Corporate Governance: What Has Happened and Where
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Indeed, if the defense of unclean hands had been taken into account
earlier, it may have deterred the kind of “me-first maneuverings around
executive pay in corporate America” that have, once again, “generated
untold millions for aggressive managers and monster losses for unwitting
taxpayers.” 224 At the very least, it could have remedied excessive pay
where warranted. It bears repeating that seeking the rescission of salary or
incentive-based excessive pay or defending a breach of contract action for
withholding it on the basis of unclean hands may succeed where other
lawsuits fail and/or where regulatory efforts are lax.225
Recognition of the defense in breach of contract actions may have
prevented the litigation costs borne by New York taxpayers in the lawsuit
filed on their behalf against former New York Stock Exchange CEO
Richard Grasso. 226 Grasso’s rich $186 million retirement package—one of
Wall Street’s biggest paychecks—was alleged to be excessive and the

We Need to Go, 38 BUS. ECON. 4 (2003); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral
Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27 n.129 (2003) (noting history of reactionary
regulation after markets drop); Martin, supra note 67, at 533 (commenting that legislative
reform punishes wrongdoers and restores investor confidence, but it does not replenish lost
retirement savings or pensions); Clyde Weiss, Pension Power, AFSCME WORKS
MAGAZINE, Mar./Apr. 2003, http://www.afscme.org/publications/5346.cfm (last visited
Mar. 17, 2010) (explaining that the Enron bankruptcy in 2001 caused losses of $1.5 billion
in retirement assets of AFSCME union members); see also Anenson & Lahey, supra note
142, at 496, 505-07 (discussing the fiscal distress of the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation that insures corporate pensions in the event of termination). Professor
DiMatteo explains Aristotle’s conception of equity and contract: “The use of equitable
principles in contracting should function as a praxis for habit-formation in the development
of the traits of law-abidance and ‘just application of the principles of equality.’” DIMATTEO,
supra note 123, at 13 (quoting W. VON LEYDEN, ARISTOTLE ON EQUALITY AND JUSTICE 81
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985)). Most recently, there are serious questions being
raised as to whether the House Bill’s attempt to reign in executive pay, if passed, will have
the desired effect. See Gretchen Morgenson, Fair Game: Imperfect Politics of Pay, N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
09,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/business/09gret.html?emc=eta1.
224. See Morgenson, supra note 219.
225. See discussion supra Parts II & III; see also Markham, supra note 60, at 318-19
(noting difficulty of breach of contract actions against executives for their misconduct and
citing cases of former CEOs Robert J. O’Connell at Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
and Ron Zebeck at Metris). Although principles of equity support the use of unclean hands
offensively, there have been no cases to date where litigants have advocated unclean hands
as a basis for rescission. See 17 B C.J.S. Contracts § 459 (2009) (discussing grounds for
partial rescission); see also Tracy A. Thomas, Bailouts, Bonuses and the Return of Unjust
Gains, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 437, 444 (2009) (citing precedent showing partial rescission of
a contract is available under extreme circumstances and when the provision to be rescinded
is severable from the rest of the contract).
226. Aaron Lucchetti & Paul Davies, Grasso Braces for Long Battle over Pay Ruling,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2006, at B1 (reporting that attorney fees were estimated to be $100
million before trial); Markham, supra note 60, at 318 (“[T]he fight over Grasso’s pay is
becoming a poster child for reasons not to challenge executive pay in court.”).
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product of manipulation.227 Even Michael Ovitz, a former Disney
executive, may have had a more difficult time collecting and keeping his
$140 million severance had the Board raised unclean hands after he badly
bungled the company during his short tenure. 228 During the (last) Great
Depression, the “clean hands” doctrine may have even been effective to
help stop the bleeding of companies by CEOs and their outsized pay where
shareholder litigation on behalf of the company produced only spotty
results. 229
Currently, there is plenty for “clean hands” to cure. CEO selfindulgence has shown that “public companies have become largely
personal ATMs.” 230 The conduct of former Countrywide CEO, Angelo
Mozilo, provides a ready example. 231 His bad behavior exemplifies all the
227. Aaron Lucchetti & Joann S. Lublin, Grasso Is Ordered to Repay Millions in
Compensation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2006, at A1; Landon Thomas, Jr., Grasso Wins Some
Rulings in Pay Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at C1; Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, Spitzer
Files Suit Seeking Millions of Grasso Money; Action Targets Ex-Chief of NYSE and
Exchange Over $200 Million Package, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2004, at A1 (discussing
lawsuit filed by New York Attorney General against the New York Stock Exchange, its
former Chairman, Dick Grasso, and the former Chairman of the Compensation Committee
of the Board of Directors and seeking recovery of over $100,000,000 paid to Mr. Grasso as
compensation which was unreasonable, uninformed, and the product of intimidation); see
also Markham, supra note 60, at 316 (criticizing Spitzer’s allegations that Grasso was
overpaid as the chairman of a not-for-profit institution and deceived the Board as to his
retirement package).
228. See discussion supra Part III; see also JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY
OF U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS FROM ENRON TO REFORM 32 (2006) (noting other cases of
excessive executive compensation at Walt Disney that included Jeffrey Katzenberg, who
was paid $280 million by Disney to settle his compensation claims, and CEO Michael
Eisner, who was paid over $750 million “while he was making some colossal management
blunders as head of the company”).
229. Most of these lawsuits stem from the sheer size of the pay as opposed to any aftercontract conduct regarding pay that harmed the company. See Washington, supra note 60
(discussing executive pay case concerning executive Charles M. Schwab and Charles
Mitchell); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
230. Khurana & Zelleke, supra note 4; accord After Rescue, supra note 22 (“‘It’s very
unfortunate, but a culture of entitlement has emerged among Wall Street executives,’ said
Peter Morici, a University of Maryland economist. ‘They’re paid far too much money and
they’re trying to find ways around the rules.’”).
231. The SEC’s lawsuit against Mozilo is the highest profile government legal action
against a CEO in the current financial crisis. Peter Barnes & Joanna Ossinger, Countrywide
Ex-CEO Angelo Mozilo Charged With Fraud, FOXBUSINESS ONLINE, June 04, 2009
available at http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/countrywide-ceo-mozilo-chargedfraud/. These charges stem from Mozilo misleading the market as to Countrywide’s loose
lending practices and his $140 million sale of Countrywide shares at the time that
Countrywide was on the brink of a mortgage meltdown. Id. According to an independent
compensation consultant hired by Countrywide, during the same time period, Mozilo
negotiated an inflated pay package with easy bonus targets based on a flawed peer group.
Elizabeth MacDonald, Highlights from CEO Pay Hearing Today, FOXBUSINESS ONLINE,
available at http://emac.blogs.foxbusiness.com/2008/03/07/highlights-from-the-fat-cat-
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possible repercussions of unclean hands on the part of corporate executives.
During the negotiation of his compensation package, he fired two
independent compensation consultants who had concluded that his pay
package was excessive before he found a consultant to approve it. 232
Notably, Mozilo’s bonus targets under the contract were set at
approximately half the company’s current revenue. 233 After Mozilo’s
strong-arm tactics secured his unreasonable compensation, he then engaged
in and potentially covered up the reckless risk-taking that brought down the
company. 234 Whether or not the SEC is able to secure a judgment against
him for fraud and insider trading, unclean hands should allow the company
to reclaim some of the money he pocketed at its expense. 235
Of course, the devil is in the details of any litigation. A court would
still need to find and weigh the relevant facts and circumstances outlined
earlier before it would invoke unclean hands.236 Moreover, for the defense
to work, directors must be willing to withhold payment—and defend the
lawsuit on behalf of the company on the basis of unclean hands—and/or
seek rescission if payment has already been made. 237
It is well known that director indulgence of CEO salaries and other
incentives has contributed to overcompensation.238 Directors have also
participated in various forms of wrongdoing. Nevertheless, board tolerance
(or feigned ignorance) has not occurred in every situation. To be sure,
hearing-today/.
232. See MacDonald, supra note 170; see also Bizjak et al., supra note 213 (discussing
the perils of compensation consultants).
233. See MacDonald, supra note 232.
234. For instance, Mozilo threatened to quit (triggering a severance package that
included liquidating 12 million shares in the bank) if the company refused to pay the income
taxes on his wife’s use of the company jet. MacDonald supra note 170. He also sought to
collect $3 million in benefits that he was eligible to receive only when he retired. Id.
235. See Robert Khuzami, “Statement from an SEC Director on Mozilo Charges,” June
4, 2009, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch060409rk.htm (discussing
the filing of fraud charges against Countrywide executives); see also Barnes & Ossinger,
supra note 231. Mozilo’s salary was nearly $2 million when Countrywide’s stock plunged
80% from its five year peak. MacDonald, supra note 170. He also received $20 million in
stock awards as part of his performance measure (and sold another $121 million in stock)
despite Countrywide’s reporting of $1.6 billion in losses. Id. Mozilo stood to gain upwards
of $100 million in severance when Countrywide was purchased by Bank of America.
Barnes & Ossinger, supra note 231.
236. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 60, at 316 (listing Grasso’s accomplishments while
in charge of the New York Stock Exchange).
237. The potential viability of the “clean hands” doctrine in excessive pay cases may
also provide bargaining leverage to a company so that executives reconsider asserting their
right to extreme compensation. The fact that directors will litigate the contract case on
behalf of the company should minimize the possibility that the CEO could successfully
claim unclean hands or in pari delicto. Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands,
supra note 29 (distinguishing the two defenses).
238. See the discussion in supra note 107.
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countless cases of CEO shenanigans concerning compensation have caused
harm to their companies without the knowledge or involvement of the
board. The many instances of stock option backdating are one example. 239
Executive acceptance of underpriced initial public offerings is another
example. 240 Significantly, in both situations, evidence from business
research suggests that the number of executives exposed by such ethical
failings is but the tip of the iceberg. 241 Therefore, not only is it possible
that directors will raise the doctrine of “clean hands,” but the defense can
potentially capture conduct that the SEC and other enforcement agencies
cannot (or have not).

239. While the board of directors is typically not involved in these schemes—for
example, Apple Computer—other executives besides the CEO can be party to them—for
example, Converse Technologies. A recent incident forced CEO Bruce Karatz at KB
Homes to resign. He is facing criminal charges with the potential of life in prison. He is
alleged to have defrauded investors by backdating millions of stock options over six years
for a personal profit of $7 million and then lying about it. See Spotlight On Stock Options
Backdating, available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/optionsbackdating.htm (describing
SEC enforcement actions against stock options backdating).
Stock options allow the recipients to buy shares at the price for which a stock is
trading on a certain date. Backdating can make options more valuable by allowing the
recipient to pay the price at which a stock was trading on an earlier date, when the stock was
selling for less. Backdating is not illegal per se, but companies are required to disclose and
account for any back-dating. Ritter, supra note 75, at 133. The issuance of additional
shares dilutes the ownership interests of the existing stockholders. Id. at 132. It is estimated
that the revelation of backdating results in a stock price drop for the average firm of
approximately 7%, roughly $400 million in market value, while the average gain from
backdating to the executives is only about $500,000 per firm annually. See M.P. Narayanan
et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597 (2007)
(discussing the impact of backdating stock options); see also Ritter, supra note 75, at 137
(concluding that the disproportionate effect of private gains to executives through stock
option backdating are small in comparison to the costs imposed on shareholders).
240. Executives who have been “spun” (bribed) by investment banks are less likely to
switch investment bankers on subsequent deals. Xiaoding Lui & Jay R. Ritter, Corporate
Executive Bribery: An Empirical Analysis (2007 Working Paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968712; see also Ritter, supra note 75,
at 138 (noting that when Bernie Ebbers was receiving underpriced IPO allocations from
Citigroup and its predecessors during 1996-2001, Worldcom paid over $100 million in
investment banking fees on various deals, nearly all going to Citigroup companies). Underpricing of IPOs raises less money for the issuing firm and reduces the returns of their preissue shareholders. Ritter, supra note 75, at 139.
241. See Ritter, supra note 75, at 131-41. Professors Heron and Lie estimate that 29% of
publicly traded U.S. firms manipulated grants to top executives at some point between 1996
and 2005, with the frequency higher for tech firms, small firms, and firms with high stock
price volatility. Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top
Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated? (2008 Working Paper), available at
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/Grants-11-01-2006.pdf. Professors Lui and Ritter
identified 134 officers and directors of 56 companies that went public in 1996-2000 for
which one or more of the corporate executives were recipients of hot initial public offering
allocations from its bookrunner. Lui & Ritter, supra note 240.
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Furthermore, even providing for the penchant of directors to defer to
the CEO, the changing legal landscape and public furor over executive pay
should cause directors to reconsider their alliances. Shareholder advocates,
especially institutional investors, are rallying against runaway executive
pay and boards are responding. 242 Board member positions are now at
stake. 243 Increasing public and investor oversight should encourage
directors to resort to equity and withhold or rescind payment when
warranted. 244 Warren Buffet’s warning to companies is undeniable: “[I]n
judging whether corporate America is serious about reforming itself, CEO
pay remains the acid test.”245
Potential political safeguards, such as requiring an independent
compensation committee not paid by management, should also help curb
compensation excesses at the outset or facilitate the later assertion of
contractual defenses such as unclean hands. 246 Impending reforms will not
242. For anecdotal evidence of board responsiveness to shareholder activism, see Lui &
Ritter, supra note 240, at 2 n.3 (noting the high-profile cases of Pfizer and Home Depot
where the vote-no campaign contributed to the ouster of the CEO); L. Reed Walton,
Preliminary U.S. Postseason Report, RiskMetrics Group, Risk & Governance Blog,
available at http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2008/07/preliminary_us_postseason_repo.html (last
visited May 22, 2009) (describing how Washington Mutual reversed its bonus decision,
replaced the chair of the human resources committee and made a number of other significant
governance changes after nine directors received at least 26% opposition, including more
than 40% opposition for the chair of the human resources committee, at the company’s
annual shareholder meeting). To defuse public anger, several companies have recently
revamped the compensation structure of executive and other employee pay. See Francesco
Guerrera & Julie MacIntosh, JPMorgan to Lift Pay and Cut Bonuses, FIN. TIMES, July 25,
2009 (reporting that JPMorgan’s compensation decision mirrors decisions by Morgan
Stanley, Citigroup and UBS). For additional discussion of say on pay reform, see supra Part
II.A.
243. Vote no campaigns that target particular board members have proven effective in
reducing CEO pay. See Ertimur et al., supra note 42, at 27-31 (showing $3.1 million
reduction in total compensation across firms and a $5.5 million reduction in firms with
abnormal pay); see also J.A. Grundfest, Just Vote-No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing
with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993) (explaining vote no
campaigns). If directors are ousted, an excessive pay package that was negotiated by
“captured” directors may later be reconsidered by new directors who may be more willing to
halt bonuses and other incentive-driven compensation schemes, especially when outsized
pay is coupled with reckless risk-taking that causes harm to the firm.
244. CEOs, in particular, have achieved celebrity status with attendant public appetite for
information. See Patricia S. Abril & Ann M. Olazábal, The Celebrity CEO: Corporate
Disclosure at the Intersection of Privacy and Securities Laws, 46 HOUSTON L. REV. 1545
(2010); see also Ertimur et al., supra note 42, at 23 (noting increased public access to
company financial information after Enron).
245. Warren Buffet, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2003 Annual Report (2003).
246. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (“Compensation consulting firms, which provide cover for generous
compensation packages voted by boards of directors, have a conflict of interest because they
are paid not only for their compensation advice but for other services to the firm—services
for which they are hired by the officers whose compensation they advised on.” (citing, for
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completely eliminate all factors that contribute to contract terms overly
favorable to top executives. 247 But even so, aggressive tactics by
executives to take undue advantage of those terms clearly leaves a role for
the “clean hands” doctrine.248
The defense’s most opportune function, however, is perhaps its most
important. Unclean hands could be utilized to correct ongoing problems
with the payment of bonuses at AIG and the nine other financial firms that
received billions of dollars in federal funds. 249 At AIG, the political and
example, BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 85, at 37-39)), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 1579, 173
L.Ed.2d 675 (Mar 09, 2009). For a discussion of federal and state reform proposals, see
supra Parts II & III.
247. See, e.g., Stephen M. Salley, Note, “Fixing” Executive Compensation: Will
Congress, Shareholder Activism, or the New SEC Disclosure Rules Change the Way
Business Is Done in American Boardrooms?, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 757 (2009) (discussing the
efforts and likely effectiveness of Congress, activist shareholders, and the SEC’s new
executive compensation disclosure rules); Frank Rich, Wall Street Gets Rich at Main
Street’s Expense, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 20, 2009, at 6-7 (expressing pessimism
that there will be comprehensive financial reform). For discussion of peer group abuse and
its effects, see Jensen et al., supra note 217, at 56 (“We believe that the misuse of survey
information provided by compensation consultants has led to systematic increases in
executive pay levels.”); see also Markham, supra note 60, at 286 (discussing abuses of peer
groups). The peer group that is used to analyze CEO compensation is seldom reported and
often differs from the group used on the performance graph on the firm’s proxy statement.
See John W. Byrd et al., Discretion in Financial Reporting: The Voluntary Disclosure of
Compensation Peer Groups in Proxy Statement Performance Graphs, 15 CONT. ACCT’G
RES. 25 (1998) (analyzing selection of firms on the performance graph in the proxy);
Michael Faulkender & Jun Yang, Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition of
Compensation Peer Groups (2008) (working paper, on file with authors) (examining choice
of peer groups in sample of 395 of the S&P 500 firms and 262 of the S&P Mid-Cap 400
firms that provided explicit lists of compensation peer companies in their first fiscal year
ending after December 15, 2006).
248. A recent study of changes made in pay practices by 191 of the nation’s largest
companies in the first half of 2009 shows that, despite the deleterious consequences of
short-term profiteering to the U.S. economy, short-term incentives are an even bigger
component of compensation. Gretchen Morgenson, Fair Game: The Quick Buck Just Got
Quicker,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
15,
2009,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/business/16gret.html?_r=1. A prior survey disclosed
that 74% of corporate executives believed that bending the rules was acceptable to achieve
performance goals. John F. Veiga et al., Why Managers Bend Company Rules, 18 ACAD.
MGT. PERSP. 84 (2004). Banks have also resurrected the practice of giving guaranteed
bonuses that provide million-dollar payouts regardless of performance. See Eric Dash,
Effort to Reign in Pay on Wall Street Hits New Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009, at A1,
A3 (reporting guaranteed bonuses made by Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan
Stanley and AIG’s pending $281 million bonus payouts to retain employees).
249. Accord Thomas, supra note 225, at 441-43, 445-46 (suggesting other equitable
theories like unjust enrichment and constructive trust to remedy the AIG bonus problem); cf.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, A.I.G.’s Bonus Blackmail, OpEd, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/opinion/18cunningham.html?_r=1 (suggesting the
analysis of traditional contract defenses and other legal remedies to rescind the March 2009
bonus payments at AIG). The initial bonuses were paid in March 2009. Bernard, supra
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public pressure to withhold payment to executives and other employees
responsible for the downfall of these companies has delayed the latest
round of these purportedly contractually-mandated payments. 250 It must be
emphasized that the defense’s application in these situations has the
potential to save the public millions of dollars. 251 Add to that amount the
millions in bonuses planned by government-controlled mortgage finance
giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under existing contracts, and it is
worth the effort to analyze whether these employees still retain their “clean
hands” that would allow continuing compensation.252
note 22. The second round was scheduled for July 2009. Id. For news of bonuses at the
banks, see Story & Dash, supra note 25.
250. Lavonne Kuykendall, AIG Holds Off On Some Bonus Payments, WALL ST. J., July
24, 2009 (reporting that AIG held off on the July payments and is negotiating with its
executives to reduce the bonus payments due to employees of the company’s financial
products unit). All bonuses were contracted for in 2008 before the government bailout. Id.
For 2009 contracts, the Obama Administration has power to reject executive pay plans for
companies that are part of the $700 billion bank bailout. Id. Kenneth Feinberg of the
Treasury Department was reviewing proposals for executive compensation packages
submitted by seven bank and industrial companies on August 13, 2009. Deborah Solomon,
U.S. Pay Czar to Rework Contracts Deemed High, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2009 (listing
companies as Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp., American International Group Inc.,
General Motors Co., Chrysler Corp., Chrysler Financial and GMAC Financial Services
Inc.). Treasury will reduce the salaries of the top twenty-five earners at companies
receiving government aid; certain executives have been given immunity like AIG’s new
CEO, Robert Benmosche. Leslie Scism, et al., AIG Chief: Loud Voice and Listener’s Ear,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2009, at C1, C5 (reporting Benmosche’s government-approved pay
package is worth $7 to $10 million).
251. The AIG payments include $235 million for employees of the financial unit
responsible for the company’s downfall as well as the subsequent installments of $9 million
in bonuses for top executives. Bernard, supra note 22. The March 2009 bonus payments to
employees in the financial products unit totaled $165 million. Cunningham, supra note 249;
see also Jeremy Pelofsky & Lilla Zuill, AIG Reveals $455 Million in 2008 Performance
Bonuses,
Reuters,
May
5,
2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE5446VC20090505 (reporting that these
additional payments would supplement performance bonuses of $454 million paid to
employees and executives in 2008). Extending the doctrine of “clean hands” to employees
(as well as CEOs and other executives) is warranted in this situation because their reckless
risk-taking caused the company’s collapse. Courts should exercise caution in invoking
unclean hands regarding pay without such morally reprehensible conduct against lowerlevel employees who do not have fiduciary duties to the company.
252. President Obama advised the Treasury Department to “pursue every single legal
avenue” to withhold or recover the AIG bonuses. Cunningham, supra note 249; see also
Brian Sullivan, Fannie, Freddie Bonuses Hit $210 Million, Apr. 3, 2009, available at
http://briansullivan.blogs.foxbusiness.com/2009/04/03/fannie-freddie-bonuses-hit-210million (reporting that the companies paid nearly $51 million in 2008, and are scheduled to
make $146 million in payments in 2009, and $13 million in 2010). Fannie and Freddie are
not recipients of TARP funds and, as a result, are not subject to nonbinding shareholder “say
on pay.” Id. (reporting that the companies are planning to pay more than $210 million in
bonuses through 2010); see also Eric Dash, Fannie Mae to Restate Results by $6.3 Billion
Because of Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at C1 (reporting that the Office of
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In summary, rather than being ill-suited for the complexity of
ascertaining “clean hands” in the case of CEO overcompensation, judges
and even juries are probably the perfect forum for weighing complicated
facts, motives, conduct, and community values. 253 It should be emphasized
that unclean hands is not being offered as an ending to the intractable issue
of executive compensation, but as a new beginning of perspective and
exploration. Accordingly, like its ancient use in contract cases, the legal
sanction of dismissal may be capable of reining in rogue business
executives and the directors who serve them. Early equity tradition reflects
the prevailing belief that corporate management has ethical responsibilities
that the common law—and equity—can help discharge. As a result, the
“clean hands” doctrine should be considered as an antidote to excessive
executive compensation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Lord Mansfield was once labeled a heretic for introducing ethicsbased equity principles into common law decision-making in commercial
cases. 254 History proved him a hero. 255 Now that “[m]anaging has given
Housing and Enterprise Oversight, which regulates Fannie Mae, announced that it was suing
its former executives to recover compensation paid to them when Fannie Mae was
overstating earnings by $6.3 billion). Prior to the EESA, Congress passed the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act in July 2008 which imposed restrictions on compensation for
executives of federal home loan banks, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and limited golden
parachute payments to executives. H.R. Rep. No. 111-50, (2009).
253. Accord Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625,
689 (1992) (asserting that the reasonable person provides guidance in choosing the
“intermediate, or mean between excess and deficiency in relations with others that involve
claims to goods” (citing ARISTOTLE, V.I NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1129b2-11 & v.2 at
1130a32-b5 (W.D. Ross & J.O. Urmson, trans., Grinnell: Peripatetic Press, 1984))); see also
Anenson, supra note 111, at 412-16 (analyzing the split among state courts whether an
equitable defense to a legal claim requires a constitutional right to trial by jury); id.
(explaining that federal constitutional law mandates trial by jury of legal claims when the
claim and defense have common issues of fact). Because unclean hands results in judicial
inaction, a calculation of an exact amount is not required, but rather only a determination
that the amount withheld was more than the CEO’s fair share.
254. See Mason, Fusion, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 12; see also
Anenson, supra note 111, at 384 (discussing how Lord Mansfield in Montefiori v.
Montefiori, 96 Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B. 1762), decided the first reported legal case invoking
equitable estoppel (citing Walter S. Beck, Estoppel Against Inconsistent Position In Judicial
Proceedings, 9 BROOKLYN L. REV. 245, 245 (1940))).
255. Id.; see also NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 12-20 (discussing how the ethical content
of the common law became greatly enriched with the awakening of social consciousness at
the time of Lord Mansfield); Henry Ingersoll, Confusion of Law and Equity, 21 YALE L.J. 59
(1912) (commenting on how Lord Mansfield “opened the common law courts to equity”).
Lord Mansfield was overheard commenting that he never liked law so much as when it
resembled equity. See Harold Greville Hanbury, The Field of Modern Equity, in ESSAYS IN
EQUITY 28 (1934) (citing Lord Dursley v. Lord Fitzhardinge, 6 Ves. 251, 260 (1827) (per
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‘way to manipulation’ and integrity has lost ‘out to illusion,’” Americans
have a compelling interest in considering an equitable solution to the
problem of excessive executive compensation. 256
The use of unclean hands in this situation is explained and supported
by ethics and business literature. It is aligned with law enforcement and
regulatory priorities, maintains the moral and ethical values of state
corporate law, and is synonymous with the tradition and meaning of equity
itself. Resort to equitable principles like unclean hands stops CEOs from
gaining more than their fair share and allows management to reclaim the
moral high ground. With state and federal governments revisiting reforms,
an additional corrective of equity will help curtail the current climate of
graft and greed.
We are not the first generation to watch our most powerful firms and
financial icons fall from grace. 257 With the temptations engendered by
massive amounts of wealth that continue to accumulate in economic
entities, we will likely not be the last. Critics of the current corporate
environment have called for “nothing less than a cultural change.” 258 Law
has the ability to influence social progress.259 The legal process both
reflects and determines the values of society. 260 The experience of equity is
evidence of this dynamic and reflective process. Over hundreds of years,
equity has made inroads in the law and resulted in its modification and
amenability to notions of fairness and justice.261 History teaches that courts
Lord Eldon)); see also Mason, Fusion, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 93, at 17
(explaining that Mansfield was a member of the equity bar prior to becoming a judge).
256. Arthur Levitt, The “Numbers Game” (address at the New York University Center
for Law and Business, New York, NY, September 25, 1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.
257. LAUFER, supra note 8, at 42. See generally Markham, supra note 60 (recounting
tales of outrageous and abusive executive pay practices over the centuries).
258. Levitt, supra note 256; cf. Eleanor W. Myers, “Simple Truths” about Moral
Education, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 823 (1996) (explaining the widespread concern for declining
values in the legal profession and the appreciation that the commercial pressures of
workplaces unsympathetic to ethical practice have had the greatest impact on shaping
professional behavior).
259. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 197, at 752-53 (declaring
that our institutions and processes do determine what kind of people we are (rejecting Grant
Gilmore’s proposition that “[l]aw reflects, but in no sense determines the moral worth of a
society” (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110-11 (1977) (Storrs
Lectures, Yale Law School)))); see also Norman D. Bishara, Legislating Business Ethics:
Corporate Governance, Stakeholders,and Encouraging Ethical Action (2009) (Michigan
Business School Working Paper, on file with authors) (exploring whether legislation can
influence the ethical values of corporate leaders).
260. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 197 at 752-53.
261. See generally Glenn & Redden, supra note 114, at 753 (reviewing history of equity
to demonstrate that the traditional theory of the equitable process can help solve modern
problems); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, The Relations Between Equity and Law, 11 MICH. L.
REV. 537, 567 n.23 (1913) (explaining that equity resulted in “a liberalizing and
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can utilize unclean hands to stop present pay abuses and simultaneously
affect future social change.
It is time for the judiciary to join the political branches in a
comprehensive response to executives bent on exploiting institutional
weaknesses. Legislation and regulatory policy evolve in a complex
political and social environment. It is well known that businesses “seek not
only to comply with regulators and regulations but also to influence
them.” 262 Admittedly, a case-based solution to the problem of excessive
executive compensation is but one of many methods of addressing an issue
inherent in corporate America.263 But given the failure and insufficiency of
the current law and enforcement efforts, it could be an important part of the
overall solution. 264 As such, courts should consider unclean hands an
additional safeguard against the social costs and corresponding moral
outrage caused by wayward corporate stewards who unabashedly accept
modernizing of the law” (quoting Pound)). Professor Stephen Burbank describes the
importance of equitable principles in the progress of the law:
We have been fortunate that our system has included, most of the time and in
most American jurisdictions, both law and equity, each of which requires the
other and both of which, in combination, have helped us over more than two
hundred years to make social and economic progress. That progress has often
not come easily, and there is much of it still to be done.
Burbank, supra note 81, at 1346.
262. LAUFER, supra note 8, at 30; see also Frank Partnoy, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW
DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 5 (New York: Time Books, 2003)
(outlining the ability of businesses to shape regulatory policy and reform); Michael J.
Cooper et al., Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns, J. FIN. (forthcoming
2009) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=940790 (tracking 25
years of firm political contributions and finding a positive effect on future stock returns).
For recent examples of the apparent regulatory capture of the SEC, see generally Ritter,
supra note 75 (recounting the failure to sufficiently investigate the Ponzi scheme of Bernie
Madoff and CEO stock option backdating). For the influence of big business on the SEC’s
attempts to regulate executive compensation in particular, see Martin, supra note 67, at 531
(relaying how the SEC abandoned its effort to increase shareholder involvement in the
nomination of directors after the business community opposed it).
263. See Khurana & Zelleke, supra note 4, at B4 (“We need to rethink how American
business ought to be run, including changes to fiduciary duties, legal liability, takeover rules
and business education, among many other areas.”).
264. See generally Nim Razook, Common Law Obedience in a Regulatory State, 47 AM.
BUS. L.J. 75 (2010) (championing the role of judge-made law in supplementing the
shortfalls of regulatory policy related to business). Earlier calls for corporate reform
continue to describe the perils of the existing system:
[S]hareholder democracy, and the state chartering of corporations that are, in
some ways far larger than their host states, have as much chance of keeping our
giant corporations virtuous as wigs on judges have of making them wise, and
the wrist slaps called criminal law have deterred corporate crimes as effectively
as a fishing net slows an elephant.
Ralph Nader & Mark Green, Corporate Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1979, at F17. See
generally LAUFER, supra note 8 (discussing the failure of corporate criminal law).
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golden parachutes as their companies go down in flames. 265

265. See Andrews & Baker, supra note 24 (predicting a popular backlash against the
government’s efforts to underwrite Wall Street due to AIG’s $450 million bonus payment
plan, explaining that “[o]f all the financial institutions that have been propped up by
taxpayer dollars, none has received more money than A.I.G. and none has infuriated
lawmakers more with practices that policy makers have called reckless”); Ferri & Weber,
supra note 3, at 2 (“In the eyes of the public, the government intervention was a bailout for
those Wall Street executives who had been profiting from the very actions causing the credit
crisis.”); Mark Maremont et al., Before the Bust, These CEOs Took Money Off the Table,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 2008, at A1 (featuring CEOs of Countrywide Financial Corporation,
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, among others in a list of fifteen CEOs of large homebuilding and financial-services firms who each reaped “more than $100 million in cash
compensation and proceeds from stock sales during the past five years”). For similar
conduct by U.S. CEOs throughout history, see Markham, supra note 60, at 292-93
(discussing golden parachutes for William Agee at Bendix, John Kanas at North Fork
Bancorp, James Kilts at Gillette, Wallace Barr at Caesars Entertainment, Steve Ross at
Warner Brothers, Henry McKinnell at Pfizer, and Richard Grasso at the New York Stock
Exchange, among others).

